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ABSTRACT
This dissertation investigates the wealth of information regarding the Classical 
Athenian family, gender relations, and law found in the inheritance speeches of 
Isaeus. In examining Isaeus as a corpus of evidence, this thesis reveals both 
general conceptions of the family and the rules and customs that governed the 
sexual, legal, and economic relations within it. Inherent in its context-based 
approach to interpretation is a consideration of the Athenian legal system, 
specifically the forensic arena, and how it influenced disputes over the 
transmission of property in the polis. Isaeus illustrates the legal and economic 
capabilities of female citizens in fourth century Athens, the use of their sexuality 
as a weapon in court, the opportunities for and restrictions on exploitation within 
the citizen family, the role of the logographos in attaining and preventing that 
exploitation, and the simultaneous zeal and ambivalence of the Athenian legal 
system regarding familial and societal conflict.
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INTRODUCTION
The investigation of the speeches of Isaeus presents an exciting 
opportunity to the ancient historian. In studying the twelve extant speeches 
attributed to this fourth century B.C. Athenian logographos , the historian 
bridges three of the most thought-provoking and dynamic fields within 
Classical studies: the family, gender relations, and the law. Each of these 
fields has experienced dramatic growth in recent years,^ and each has 
generated new approaches to, perspectives on, and interpretations of 
Athenian society. Yet, each is in a very different stage of development: while 
the interest in Athenian law is centuries-old, the study of the Athenian family 
is relatively new, and the field of Classical Athenian gender relations has 
barely celebrated its fifteenth birthday.^ Isaeus himself has received 
substantial reference in recent works in these fields, but only as a source of 
individual passages, not as a corpus of evidence. A detailed investigation of 
the sibling rivalries, contested adoptions, financial wrangling, and familial 
mayhem found in Isaeus's speeches not only allows us to merge three 
exceptionally fertile areas of scholarly investigation with completely different 
theoretical and developmental identities, but also to more fully examine the 
work of an individual on whom we heavily rely for our progress in these 
fields. In answering the question "What can Isaeus tell us about the family 
and gender relations in fourth century Athens?" this dissertation will reveal 
the contributions that Isaeus makes to our understanding of tlie Classical polis 
and the contentious sexual, legal, and economic relations found there.
Isaeus: Life and Works
Who was Isaeus? We know very little of his life, and even these details 
come from commentators well removed from Isaeus and his time. Isaeus was 
born in 415 B.C. and began his career, one of exclusive focus on forensic 
oratory, ca. 380. Dionysius of Halicarnassus wrote that he was "the brilliant 
artistic resource which makes it the real spring from which the rhetorical
 ^1998 alone saw the publication of Cynthia Patterson's The Family in Greek H istory, Cheryl 
Anne Cox’s Household Interests: Property, M arriage Strategies, and Family D ynam ics in A ncien t 
A th en s , and Matthew Christ's The Litigious A thenian. See their bibliographies, as well as 
Todd's (1993).
^The study of women in Classical Athens is much older than the study o f gender relations, by 
which I mean the study of tlie relations and relationships between men and women and how 
society was structured around them. That men and women cannot be studied separately 
from each other is a central tenet of gender relations, and materialised as a new approach to 
studying Athenian society in the mid 1980s, following developments in feminist history 
developed over Hie previous decade. See Katz (1995) 30-32,35-36.
power of Demosthenes flows'',^ and his inclusion in [Plutarch]'s and 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus' accounts of the most famous Attic orators clearly 
points to his success. Yet, the information we possess about his life is wholly 
unsatisfactory. Dionysius devoted his treatment of Isaeus almost exclusively 
to his effectiveness as an orator, claiming that information about his birth and 
death, the kind of life he led, and his political opinions simply was not 
available. His ethnic origin is contested: some ancient sources, including 
Hermippus, claimed that Isaeus was of Athenian birth,^ while [Plutarch] 
claimed that Isaeus hailed from Chalcis.  ^The accepted view today is that he, 
like his predecessor Lysias, was a metic, a foreign resident without the rights 
of citizenship. Isaeus studied in Athens under Isocrates as a young man and 
gained an enduring reputation for being the teacher of Demosthenes, 
possibly writing the speeches that his more famous pupil used against his 
guardians successfully in court.  ^According to [Plutarch], Isaeus wrote sixty- 
four speeches, fifty of which were genuine.^ Today we possess a dozen, and 
their genuineness cannot be ascertained.
Isaeus was a forceful and effective speech-writer, and it was these 
qualities that made his reputation. [Plutarch] commented that "he was the 
first to give artistic form to his speeches and turn his attention to the urbane 
style of the orator".  ^ He was praised for his clear, precise language, his 
technical skill, and his attention to detail.^ Upon first reading, his speeches 
seem quite convincing, but the superficial strength of many of his arguments 
can be exposed through a more thorough analysis. Insinuation, subtle and 
outright defamation, contrived analysis, and the use of rhetorical questions 
and probability play important roles in his arguments. He repeats points and 
questions to shroud the weakness of an argument and emphasises the 
significance of only partially applicable laws. Dionysius portrays him as a 
writer of masterful abilities whose cleverness with the pen made him and his 
motives suspect: he had "a reputation among his contemporaries for 
chicanery and deception", he was the target of accusations of devising 
speeches for the worse cause, and he used stratagems to out-marshal the 
jury.to Pytheas, in a deliberate insult, accused Demosthenes of digesting the
^Dion. Hali. Isaios Athenaios 3.
4ibid.. 1.
^[Plu.] Lives of the Ten Orators 839E, 844B.
^ibid.. 839 F, 844B; Dion. Hali. Isaios Athenaios 1. 
7[Plu.] Lives of the Ten Orators 839F.
8ibid.
^Dion. Hali. Isaios Athenaios 3. 
lOibid 3-4.
whole of Isaeus, rhetorical technique and alld  ^ Apparently, the forceful 
effectiveness of his speeches and his success with his craft was somewhat 
counterproductive, casting a cloud of suspicion over his words and actions.
Yet, in the eyes of first century scholars, Isaeus was a significant figure.. 
Isaeus was included in the "Canon of Attic Orators", most likely the work of 
Dionysius' contemporary, Caecilius of C a l a c t e , ^ ^  and Dionysius himself 
viewed Isaeus as the link between Lysias, the master of early Attic oratory, 
and Demosthenes, the greatest of Athenian orators. Lysias (459-380 B.C.), 
whose forensic career spanned the last twenty- three years of his life, wrote 
two hundred speeches to be presented in court. A famed and prosperous 
shield-manufacturer who moved in the best intellectual circles in Athens, 
Lysias was not a citizen, and could not deliver any of the speeches he wrote. 
He took up the pen after returning from a forced exile under the reign of the 
Thirty Tyrants. A writer of moderation, simplicity, and precision, Lysias 
relied more on smoothness and regularity of structure than did Isaeus, and 
the personalities he developed in his speeches were more multi-dimensional. 
Lysias penned speeches for cases ranging from embezzlement and 
profiteering to murder and sacrilege.
Demosthenes (384-322 B.C.) was an even more versatile speech-writer. 
He wrote political orations as well as law-court speeches, and, as a citizen, 
was more heavily and directly invested in the city's political affairs. He is best 
known for his Philippics attacking Philip of Macedon, but he wrote and 
delivered speeches for legal cases on inheritance and guardianship, 
embezzlement and forgery, and homicide and assault. Demosthenes' greatest 
gifts were his sincerity and solemnity, and while moderate in his use of 
language, he was a master at conveying the import (or perceived import) of 
the matter at hand.
Dionysius's view of Isaeus as a central link in Attic oratory is an 
accurate one, on stylistic grounds as well as more fundamental historical 
grounds. Lysias, Isaeus, and Demosthenes are central corpora of evidence for 
any investigation of Classical Athenian law, courts, and families, but it is 
Isaeus, the expert in inheritance law, who provides us with the most diverse.
^ i^bid.
12worthington (1994) examines the possible origins of the "Canon" and concludes that 
Caecilius was its author. There were many more orators active in Athens than those whose 
speeches we possess. Worthington notes the destructive effect that the compilation of the 
"Canon" had on the survival of the works of orators not included in it. As with Lysisas, 
Demosthenes, and the other orators who have survived, Isaeus is represented by only a mere 
fraction of his complete work. We possess forty-one fragments in addition to his twelve 
speeches.
and therefore, advantageous, insight into family-oriented disputes and how 
the laws pertaining to them could be utilised effectively. As a source for the 
junction of the family, law, and courts in Athens, he is unparalleled. We 
cannot judge his versatility as a speech-writer, as we have only the twelve 
inheritance-related speeches,^^ and not the many others he scribed over the 
course of his career; a full assessment of Isaeus is impossible. That, however, 
is incidental to our task of evaluating the family and gender relations through 
his speeches. What we need for this undertaking, we possess.
Isaeus is neither an entertaining nor particularly engaging writer, 
although we cannot be sure that Isaeus did not coach his clients in delivery to 
achieve a more entertaining or engaging effect in court. What is most 
stimulating about his speeches is what they tell us about the relations among 
and between citizen men and women of his time, and it is this information — 
societal expectations of a thirty-year old woman, the exploitation of a ward 
by a guardian, brothers disputing an inheritance, the rules governing an 
heiress, the tangible benefits of marriage —that is most valuable.
Approaching Isaeus
Isaeus is known to most ancient historians today either through the 
massive commentary on him by William Wyse or through the many 
references to him in recent works on Athenian oratory, the family, and gender 
relations. Wyse's monumental work, published in 1904, incorporated both 
edited text and detailed commentary, making it the most full-fledged 
treatment of Isaeus in English. Notable for its persistent criticism of rhetorical 
technique, it represents a high-water mark in the modern suspicion of ancient 
texts as trustworthy sources. This reflected Wyse's focus on Isaeus as a 
speech-writer and manipulator of law, although there are points of social 
history in the speeches that receive substantial consideration in his work.. 
Thorough, detailed, and well-referenced, it is also dense and difficult to read, 
but is nonetheless an indispensable tool for work on our logographos. More 
recently, Richard Wevers published a short volume on the chronology.
^^Todd's (1990b) 165, n.28 176 examination of the questions of survival raises the related 
question of why we possess the twelve speeches of Isaeus we possess. Why these speeches 
and not others? In Isaeus' case, that all of the speeches of his we have are inheritance-related 
suggests that they were considered his most significant works from an early age, stylistically, 
historically, or both. Todd's emphasis on the stylistic concerns of the "edifying" Alexandrian 
schoolmasters, who preserved much of the Attic Orators, explains the lack of additional 
information about outcome, context, and identities that has traditionally accompanied texts of 
more historical interest. His reasoning would suggest primarily stylistic reasons for the 
survival of Isaeus' twelve speeches; I do not think their topical consistency, however, is 
merely coincidental.
prosopography, and social history of Isaeus (1969). Any investigation of 
Isaeus must begin with these two works. With the exception of W. A. Goligher 
and W.S. Maguiness's Index To The Speeches of Isaeus, originally published in 
parts in Hermathena, there have been no other books devoted solely to this 
orator in English, There remains one unpublished doctoral dissertation and
barely a handful of a r t i c l e s .
On the other hand, the recent interest in Athenian family, forensic 
oratory, and gender relations has made extensive use of Isaeus as a source. 
He is integral to discussions in Schapps (1979), Just (1989), and Sealey (1990), 
and Todd (1993), Scafuro (1994), and Cox (1998) have made ample use of him. 
Because the use of isolated passages from law court speeches has formed a 
fundamental part of these approaches,^  ^we only gets bits and pieces of Isaeus 
in them, and often without reference to or consideration of significant forensic 
or inheritance-related points of the cases in which they are found. Taking 
evidence from a law court speech, particularly an inheritance speech, at face 
value is a mistake, and while the works mentioned above have for the most 
part treated Isaeus and the orators with due respect,^  ^ I believe that a much 
greater understanding of Isaeus, and the Athenian family, gender relations, 
and law can be made when we carefully examine the context of a case in 
which a pertinent passage is found. Representation of a family and of gender 
relations are always dependent on the arena in which they are presented; that 
representations found in Isaeus were presented in court for the specific 
purpose of winning a legal case means that we must be especially careful with 
them.
My approach will therefore be a context-based approach, founded in 
the belief that considerations of the court ethos, the jury, and perceived social 
norms must inform every interpretation. How are interactions between citizen 
men and women represented in Isaeus' speeches? What do those interactions 
tell us about society? About Athenian families and "the family"? What don't 
they tell us? How can a law court speech obscure or misrepresent an 
interaction? These are the questions I am seeking to answer. I will focus on
I'^Lawiess (1989); Dorjahn and Fairchild (1972), Thompson (1976), and Isager (1981-2). 
l^Specificcdly Scliapps, Sealey, and, to a lesser degree. Just.
^^Schapps (1979) is the exception. With Isaeus, as with much of his evidence, his stricture- 
dominated approach results in dangerously misleading conclusions about the reality of 
women's economic transactions in Athens. His consideration (48) of the "one medimnus law" 
(Is. 10.10) is a case in point: although he sums up the context of the passage well, he attempts 
to bring this problematic law into line with other Athenian and Greek laws without 
recognising that this particular law was incidental to tlie argument being made in the case in 
which it is found. Legal stricture represented in law must be fully analysed before given 
validity as an indicator of social norm or reality.
the relations, and where possible, the relationships between citizens in the 
speeches, elucidating both how they influenced the case in question and how 
they could have been strategically misrepresented.
It is necessary to examine what we know of Isaeus and the Athens in 
which he lived and worked before we evaluate the relations and relationships 
represented in his speeches. We must have an adequate background for 
interpretation. The first chapter of this dissertation will examine the wider 
legal and historical context in which Isaeus wrote his speeches, using his own 
words to inform us on historical as well as methodological grounds. Isaeus' 
comments about the legal system and the society in which he worked help to 
reveal the advantages and disadvantages of the family, gender relations, and 
the law as paradigms for reconstructing Athenian society. Chapter Two will 
examine two general conceptions of the family presented and used as 
evidence in speech 1 and speech 8: this will give us a broad legal and social 
foundation from which to launch into the more specific thematic 
investigations of the three chapters that follow. Sexual relations, focusing on 
the interconnections between citizenship, legitimacy, and citizen women, will 
be the focus of the third chapter and will be followed by two chapters on legal 
and economic relations. The Conclusion will draw the central points of the 
four chapters together to demonstrate how Isaeus's speeches contribute to 
gaining a better understanding of fourth-century Athenian life.
Chapter One 
ISAEUS, THE LAW, AND ATHENIAN SOCIETY
An accurate interpretation of Isaeus's speeches requires an awareness of 
the context in which the speeches were written and delivered. What is the 
historical, social, and legal background against which Isaeus stands? What 
considerations must be made when drawing conclusions about the family and 
gender relations from his work? This chapter will answer these two questions, 
using selected passages from his speeches to initiate examinations of 
interpretative and methodological concerns.
A careful reading of Isaeus's speeches will alert one to the problems and 
limitations involved in using forensic oratory as evidence for investigating the 
family and gender relations in Classical Athens; Isaeus gives us most of what we 
need to acquire a sound awareness of the pitfalls involved. The appropriate 
historical information necessary to put us on solid hermeneutic ground will be 
added. We will begin with what Isaeus tells us about the Athenian legal system 
in general, and will then move on to the specifics of the forensic, familial, and 
gender contexts. I will conclude by outlining my methodological approach and 
how it attempts to handle these issues.
Isaeus: His Clients, Court, and Cases
Isaeus' clients were the social and economic elite of Athens: large fortunes 
were at stake in the cases for which he wrote. Isaeus states this specifically in 3.65 
and 4.24, and although we get little direct evidence of the size of the estates in 
those speeches, the contention is amply justified in the others. Most notable are 
the descriptions of wealth in speeches 5, 6, 8, and 11. Euctemon, the deceased 
father of speech 6, had an estate worth in excess of three talents, the components 
of which included a tenement house/brothel, a 74-minae farm, a 30000-drachmae 
bath-house, goats and a goatherd worth thirteen minae, an eight-minae and a 
550-drachmae pair of mules, and a handful of slave craftsmen (6.23, 33-34). The 
individual oikoi of speech 11 were even wealthier. Theophon left his adopted 
daughter property worth two talents, 60 sheep, 100 goats, furniture, a fine 
cavalry horse, and other goods and chattels (11.41-42), and the combined worth 
of his property and that of his son was over eight talents (11.45). Stratocles was 
worth more than 5 talents, receiving an annual income of twenty minae in
interest on loans and keeping 900 drachmae at home (11.42-43). The speaker 
possessed Hagnias's two-talent property, an additional 8000-drachmae piece of 
property, and a 2000-drachmae house in Athens (11.44-45), and Macartatus 
purchased and outfitted a trireme with the proceeds from the sale of his land (11. 
48).
The father of speech 8 gave his daughter in marriage with a twenty-five- 
minae dowry plus clothes and gold, received her back without demanding 
restitution, and gave her away in a second marriage with a second dowry of 1000 
drachmae (8.8). Ciron possessed a one-talent estate at Phyla, a 2000-drachmae 
city house and a thirteen-minae city house, and slaves and fittings worth an 
additional thirteen minae. He also received interest on loans (8.35). Part of 
Dicaeogenes II's property brought in an annual income of 80 minae (5.11,35), and 
included two small buildings outside of the city walls and sixty plethra of land 
on the Plain, as well as a bath-house (5.22-24). Pyrrhus's estate in speech 3 was 
said to be worth three talents (3.49), and the fortune of Xenaetetus in speech 10 
was valued at more than four talents (10.23). In speech 2, a sister took a twenty- 
minae dowry as well as garments and jewellery with her to Menecles, whose 
ward's land later sold for seventy minae (2.5).
These were clearly Athenian citizens of great wealth; they were also 
Athenian citizens of great standing. Isaeus' entreaties to the juries in the 
conclusions of his speeches underscore the importance of these families' financial 
commitment to the state and the plaudits that had come from such esteemed 
service. Euctemon and Philoctemon undertook the most costly public offices in 
Athens (6.38), and did so at no significant loss to the value of their holdings; one 
of Euctemon's other sons was trierarch seven times, and his grandson 
Chaerestratus was a trierarch at a young age as well as choregus and gymnasiarch 
(6.60). Both of them were among the Three Hundred, the richest class of citizens. 
Apollodorus was a trierarch, paid taxes as a knight, and contributed money 
when the state required it, supporting even a group of choir boys (7.35). 
Menexenus I spent three talents on dedications for the Acropolis (5.41) and died, 
a general, in battle (5.42), following the example set by liis family of extensive 
military, religious, and civic service (5.41-43). There are numerous other 
examples.^ While these figures could easily have been exaggerated, the point is
^See Wevers (1969) 63-68, esp. Table 10, "Instances of political and religious activity per family of 
Isaeus".
clear: these men were of considerable— in most cases, the most considerable— 
means.2
The size of such estates and the influence of the citizens fighting for them 
generated a bitterness and vindictiveness in the disputes relating to their 
ownership. Isaeus leaves us in no doubt about the nature of the Athenian 
courtroom: it was a nasty place, the inheritance battles waged there infused with 
vitriol, avarice, and the perversion of truth. Isaeus bluntly states that lawsuits 
abounded in Athens (8.4), that litigants often fabricated stories and gave false 
witness in court proceedings (8.4), and that perjury was a regular phenomenon 
(4.22). He notes that inheritance trials specifically involved despising the laws, 
insulting relatives, and contriving fictions (4.11), remarks time and again on the 
avarice, effrontery, and falsehood of his opposition (e.g. 6.30; 8.2, 3, 43; 10.1; 
11.47), rails at the insanity of an opponent (2.40), and calls his opponents quarrel- 
loving busybodies (4.30). Legal action, especially when directed against kin, was 
a disgrace (1.1, 3.73), but relatives were betrayed in the interest of money (9.25), 
most notably, by one who hawked a forged will to the highest bidder (9.22-25). 
Isaeus cites six individuals who "swooped down upon" the estate of a man who 
had just died, using all sorts of fabrications to assert their claims (4.8-10) and 
noted that this was a regular occurrence when an Athenian citizen died abroad 
(4.7-10, 21). As anyone could lay claim to an estate without penalty (4.11), the 
first stages of an inheritance adjudication could be something of a legal circus, 
undoubtedly one reason why the Athenian courtroom was such an offensive 
place that the mark of a discreet upbringing was never to have entered it as a 
child (1.1),
The variety of cases found in Isaeus speaks to the complexity of the legal 
system in which these individuals and families waged financial war on each 
other. Isaeus' third, fifth, and sixth speeches are perjury cases, initiated to convict 
witnesses of giving false testimony in previous trials, and speeches 3 and 5 make 
reference to three previous successful perjury trials (3.3; 5.12, 17). There is a 
surety case (5), one for the maltreatment of a ward (11), five that dispute the 
validity of a will or an adoption (1, 4, 7, 9, and 10) and two others in which 
adoption plays an important role (5, 6). Legitimacy plays a central role in 
speeches 3 ,6 ,8 , and 12 and a more minor role in 2, either as an accusation hurled 
at the opponent or in response to such an accusation. Isaeus' final speech, the
^See Cox (1998) 3-37 and Davies (1971) for more detailed examinations of individual and 
familial wealth and social and political connections.
only one not specifically delivered in an inheritance case, was written to defend a 
man who had been expelled from his deme and therefore had serious 
implications for his right to inherit.
Time played an important role in these disputes. Often these cases 
dragged on for years, were part of disputes perpetuated through generations, or 
were brought long after the individual whose estate was in question had died. 
The challenge to an adoption in speech 1 took place twenty-three years after the 
fact, only upon the death of the adoptive father, and in speech 5, a new will was 
introduced twelve years after the original will had been accepted by the court. 
This case was part of a twenty-two year battle of contested wills, including ten 
years of contests that followed the introduction of the second will; it was the fifth 
formal legal action to be undertaken to settle the estate in question. It is highly 
likely that there was at least an eight-year delay for the lodging of a protestation 
in speech 10, and even more likely that it was between ten and fifteen years. The 
maltreatment case in speech 11 followed two challenges to the same will and a 
similar case for maltreatment; it has been suggested that Isaeus' case was 
brought thirty-five years after the death of Hagnias II, bequeather of the estate in 
question.^ While this is arguable, it underscores the substantial duration of time 
involved in initiating and resolving inheritance disputes in court. As many, if not 
most, of these cases would have involved private or public arbitration before 
advancing to court,^ the duration of the actual conflict may have been even 
longer.
This preliminary glimpse into the Athenian legal system, its courtroom, 
and the people who fought legal cases in it compels us to confront some 
important methodological issues. First, it is clear that the forensic arena is fraught 
with danger as a source for "the truth" in Athenian society: Isaeus’ own 
unabashed comments on his legal system demonstrate that little in court was 
trusted by the Athenians themselves. Perjury, forgery, lies and falsehood 
suffused the Athenian forensic arena, and Isaeus’ commentary on these prove to 
be the best evidence for suspecting his own words. As we shall see, Isaeus 
himself contributed significantly to the fog of misrepresentation and 
manipulation found in the Athenian dikasteria. Second, we are given access here 
only to the most privileged of Athenian families, not those that would have made 
up the vast majority of its citizen population, much less its total population.
^Forster (1983) 386-387.
^We know that speeches 2,5, and 12 followed arbitration (2.29-31; 5.21-33; 12.11).
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These are wealthy, powerful, influence-peddling folk, and we are seeing them at 
an exceptional time, when they have experienced a significant loss and their 
family is relatively weak and vulnerable to exploitation. We do not get a view of 
"normal", everyday families. As representations of quotidian reality, these 
speeches make poor evidence.^
They are, however, valuable, and the four chapters that follow will detail 
more specifically what they can contribute to our understanding of Athenian 
society. Before we progress to them, we require a more detailed analysis of the 
forensic, familial, and gender issues with which we will deal throughout our 
investigation.
The Forensic Context: Background on Athenian Law
What elements of forensic dispute were important in a fourth century 
Athenian law court? How should these influence our investigation?
The Athenian court  ^was one that valued written law and believed in its 
power as an agent of behaviour modification. That the references to 6 vogoq or ol 
vogoi are most often found in the context of bestowing a right to do something 
(typically, with the verbs ôiôcojLii, KeXevco, or in the form Kara Touç that
this right was given by the laws specifically (with amog or Ôiappfjôriv)®, and that 
there are numerous examples of the laws forbidding or not allowing a certain 
action^ demonstrates the value placed on them as justifiers or modifiers of 
behaviour. The laws were frequently read aloud in court,^  ^and being able to cite 
a law that supported an assertion was important to presenting a solid case: 
Isaeus challenges his opponent in three places to name the law that prohibits the
^But, perhaps, better tiictn we might imagine. While we can say that the vast majority of citizen 
families would never have been confronted with tlie kinds of financial situations we have at hand 
in Isaeus, many, if not all, would have dealt with similar issues related to inheritance. We can 
argue that the forensic evils upon which Isaeus was so eager to expound stem from a love of 
money cultivated within wealthy circles; we can also argue that, in a land of widespread 
poverty, the desire for financial gain would have been equal or even greater among the poor(er). 
If the lower classes—tliough I use this term with caution—aspired to the mores of the wealthy, 
these forensic characteristics and the principles upon which the arguments in Isaeus were based 
may be more representative tlian we think.
^See MacDowell (1978) 34-45,240-252.
^E.g. 1.46,3.58,4.14, 6.28,9.23,10.13.
^E.g. 2.16-17,3.35,6.63,8.1,10.15,11.11.
^E.g. 4.16,;6.44,; 9.2,13,33; 10.10.
102.16-17; 3.38,42,53; 7.21-22; 8.34; 11.1,4,11.
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action he claimed was prohibited.^ That the law itself dictated the mandate of a 
public official gave it additional gravity.12
Written law was a highly valued legal and forensic tool; other forms of 
documentation were valued as well. Depositions are found in the majority of 
Isaeus' s p e e c h e s , 1 0  and there are three examples of affidavits,!^ as well as 
references to an inventory of wealth (5.3), the inscription of the names of wards 
and their guardians before the archon (6.36), the phratry register (7.16-17, 27-28), 
a surety document (5.25), and the wills found in five of Isaeus' speeches. Yet, 
that the Athenian court utilised written documents in its resolution of disputes 
does not mean that such use was without its problems. Isaeus details very clearly 
the obstacles involved in attempting to use such documents in 5.25-26. In that 
case, a document had been drawn up before a tribunal at which Leochares had 
allegedly agreed to act as surety for the estate of a friend; Leochares later denied 
that he had ever agreed to such a position and pointed to the lack of a specific 
statement to that effect in the document. The speaker thus had to excuse the 
incompleteness of the document, saying that he was hurried when it was drawn 
up. He goes on to accuse his opponents of making use of implications in the 
document that were to their advantage while demanding that what was contrary 
to their interests be explicitly affirmed in writing. The passage raises three 
important points; first, that writing, witnesses, and oral agreements were often 
used in conjunction with each other and that each could be used to ensure 
separate aspects of an agreement; second, that there could be an argument in 
court over written and implied parts of a document; and third, that parties could 
refuse to execute either.
The suspicion and vulnerability that tainted written agreements in the 
forensic arena had an historical context: the use of writing in Athens, especially 
as a form of evidence or proof in court, was relatively new. The years 410-403, 
approximately 30 years before Isaeus began practising, represented a critical 
period in the development of the Athenian legal system as it was during these 
years that Athenians embraced systematic documentation as a significant legal 
tool. The appointment in 410 of anagrapheis to collect, organise, and inscribe the 
hundreds of decrees and laws scattered throughout the cityi^ and the systematic
lll0.14,;11.5,34.
127.30.
l^E.g. 2.16,3.12,5.2, 6.26, 7.17,8.13,9.6,11.11.
143.6; 5.1,5.
l^See Harrison (1968) 26-34, MacDowell (1978) 47-49, and Lys 30.2.
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annual review of and supplementation to the corpus of laws initiated under a 
group of nomothetai in 403^  ^ signalled the development of a new legal 
consciousness. From 403 onwards, the validity of a law was wholly dependent on 
its inscription, and the old Bouleterion, renamed the Metroon, became the home 
of papyrus copies of all the laws, making it the first building in Athens devoted 
to the storage of documents. 12 The inscription of the official sacrificial calendar in 
the Stoa Basileus, just behind the inscriptions of the laws, followed in the same 
year,!^ and writing soon established itself in the courts as well. Isocrates' 
Trapeziticus speech (390s) is the first evidence of a written contract in Athens,^ ^  
and the deposition in Isaeus 5.2 (ca. 389) is our first evidence of a written 
testimony.
Writing, and specifically, systematic legal documentation, made 
awareness, accessibility, and application of the law easier and more widespread, 
but acceptance of it was slow and grudging. Well after Isaeus had finished his 
speeches, Aristotle could still comment on the fallibility of written law .20 While 
the methodological, access-oriented publication and preservation of legal 
documents generated greater legal clarity, those documents could still be 
effectively challenged when they were opposed to one's interests.
There were other important elements of forensic dispute to consider. 
Isaeus again tips us off, in three separate passages. In 8.30, he progresses to 
making his point by legal stricture only after insisting that his point is clear to 
everyone on its own: "It is clearly evident that..." he states. Such a statement, and 
the later insistence that it was "universally acknowledged" and "incontrovertible", 
presupposes an extra-strictural principle that the jury valued in its own right. A 
few lines later, in 8.39, Isaeus mentions consulting an e^ riyriTfig, or interpreter of 
divine law, regarding funeral expenses and offerings. Both signal the importance 
of specifically non-strictural, and more generally, non-"legal", codes and 
principles; the former example accentuates the value of some kind of customary 
law or convention while the latter example accentuates the value of religious or 
"divine" law. Both were beyond the narrower realm of written stricture, and both 
were valued enough to be utilised in court.
^^And. 1.81-85, Aesdi. 3.38, Dem. 24.18; MacDowell (1975). 
l^Dem. 19.129, Aesch. 3.187. 
l^Lys. 30.17-21. 
l^lsoc. 17.19-20.
2^See Carey (1996), esp. 34-38, on Athenian criticisms of written law.
13
The third passage is of special significance. In 6.59, Isaeus criticises his 
opponent for "ranting in a loud voice", and in so doing, raises the issue of orality 
in the courtroom. Athens may have been a society that valued writing and 
written law, but it was still primarily an oral culture. In every aspect of society, it 
was the spoken word that reigned, the spoken word with which people were 
most familiar and comfortable. Life revolved around oral language and the body 
language that accompanied it, and consequently, Athens was a culture, especially 
for men, of public performance. In a society where prestige was of the highest 
import to individual citizens, a good performance, especially in a contest, was 
how a man was measured. Verbal duels and contests were an integral part of the 
public debate that the democracy fostered, and participation in a political 
audience was an accepted part of citizenship. Rlietoric was the leading area of 
education, and speaking on one's feet was a skill held in the highest regard.21
The Athenians took this value system with them when they entered the 
court room. Oral considerations were essential to the preparation and 
presentation of a case in what had originally been a wholly oral arena. We must 
not allow our own experience within a document-laden society and the 
particularly text-driven discipline of ancient history cloud our ability to perceive 
the full reality of the Athenian law court in which Isaeus practised. The speeches 
with which we will deal represent only one aspect of the presentation of cases 
which Isaeus helped to orchestrate, and as such, can only reveal so much about 
those cases. As Rosalind Thomas has written: "It is surely only our modern 
confidence in and obsession with the written text which sees documents as 
entirely self-sufficient. "22
What were the specifically oral components of a strategy Isaeus and his 
client might pursue in court?23 Success in court depended on maximising the 
effect of the words in a speech through vocal and bodily delivery. To jurors 
accustomed to regular attendance at the theatre and haggling in the agora, 
intonation, tempo, and stress would be very important. How a sentence was 
spoken could add emphasis to a particular word or point essential to the success 
of the case. Body language would contribute to the effect: gestures, facial 
expressions, and deportment could also add emphasis or communicate subtle
2  ^Alcidamas, On the Sophists 9.
22Thomas (1992) 76. The conceptual change Athenians struggled with in admitting a grudging 
acceptance to written evidence in the courts is a mirror image of our own recent struggle to 
recognise and value the significance of orality in the society and law courts of Classical Athens. 
2%ee Hall (1995).
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non-verbal communication, especially mocking or jesting one's adversary. 
Spontaneity, the use of wit and humour, and improvisation^^ were skills that 
could prove valuable in winning over a jury that, far from being silent, could 
become, and probably anticipated becoming, actively involved in the trial. 
Inciting the jury to whistling, hand-clapping, and heel-drumming and 
orchestrating a partiality in the jurors' mind could work to the litigant's 
advantage.25 Entertainment via words and action was thus a central part of the 
trial—each court accommodated several hundred spectators who came to view  
the proceedings solely for their entertainment value—and litigants knew that the 
reward for catering to the jury's desire for active involvement could be a 
favourable verdict.
The degree to which Isaeus was a delivery coach in addition to a mere 
logographos we do not k n o w ,2 6  but his success mandates that he was aware of 
how to manipulate a jury, and we can be confident that this extended beyond the 
literary argument of the case. The written speeches may have been intended 
more as a guide or model than as a verbatim recitation, and the litigant's copy 
may have been supplemented with notes and marginalia regarding delivery. The 
necessity of spontaneity and adaptation and the likelihood of considerable 
editing means that it is almost certain that, in each case, we do not possess the 
speeches that Isaeus' clients delivered in court. The crucial elements of each case 
may therefore be inaccessible to us. As our assumptions regarding the merits of 
the speech are based solely on their literary content, we chance substantial 
misinterpretation.
The design of the court and the proceedings of the trial reflect the oral 
nature of the legal arena. The court itself was an open area with rows of benches 
for the jury, a bar of some sort demarcating the witness stand, and, presumably, 
two benches for the opposing parties of the case. Around this space was room for 
the spectators who came to view the legal proceedings out of interest or pleasure. 
There was no judge or judge's bench, as only a magistrate, whose duty it was to 
open and close the trial, presided. He would appoint one juror to supervise the
24Dorjahn and Fairchild (1972) have revealed Isaeus' attempts to create "an atmosphere of 
impromptu-speaking" through the deliberate inclusion of parenthetical remarks and references 
to the opponent's speech, the jury, and time in his speeches. Noteworthy is their point that Isaeus 
was the student of Isocrates, a champion of the written speech whose approach opposed the use 
of improvisation advocated by Alcidamus. It appears that Alcidamus' approach prevailed.
25See Bers (1985) 1-15, and Hall (1995) 43-45
2^See Dover (1968) 150-160 on the possible collaboration between logographos and client and 
Usher (1971) 147-50 on tlie refutation of this point.
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water-clock which regulated the time litigants could spend delivering their 
speeches and four jurors to supervise the voting procedure at the end. Upon 
entering the court, each juror was issued bronze tokens, one solid and one 
hollow, with which he would cast his vote at the end of the case. There were at 
least 300 jurors, and substantially more in many cases: Isaeus mentions 500 in On 
The Estate of Dicaeogenes (5.20). In a criminal trial, the juror would deposit one 
token, solid for guilty or hollow for innocent, into an urn, which would then 
have all of its contents counted, and the verdict would thus be decided 
numerically. How exactly the voting with tokens was accomplished in 
inheritance trials is unclear.
The trial itself was straightforward. The court clerk read the charge, the 
litigants gave their speeches, and the jury's vote immediately followed. Although 
there may have been murmurs and whispers among the jurors waiting in line to 
cast their tokens, there was no formal discussion or debate of any kind. The jury 
received no instructions or directions from the magistrate at any point in the 
course of the trial. Witnesses (or the depositions they provided) could be called 
upon in the speeches, but only to verify or assent to what a litigant had already 
said; there was only the most limited cross-examination and no rule regulated 
the relevance of evidence utilised in a case. Consequently, who was giving 
evidence or asserting the veracity of a claim as a witness was often more 
important than what the particular evidence was. It was the responsibility of the 
litigant or his logographos to find and utilise any law that was applicable (or 
seemingly applicable) in the case.
Every case that made it to trial had first been through arbitration, the 
purpose of which was to attempt a reconciliation between the contestants in the 
case. If reconciliation was not possible and the judgement handed down by the 
arbiters was not accepted, the case went to trial, and the decision of the jury was 
final. There was no further appeal. Since compromise had proven untenable in 
arbitration, the only option left to settling the dispute was to vote for one of the 
two sides and create a binding decision. Inheritance cases fell under the auspices 
of the archon, and a notice of each arbitration and trial regarding the adjudication 
of an estate was publicly posted in the agora or the Assembly.
The Athenian Concept of Justice
We have examined several influential aspects of an Athenian trial; what 
we must do now is examine the jury as the target of this influence and the arbiter
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of justice, and come to a conclusion regarding how its two dimensions did or did 
not meet. What was the Athenian jury and their concept of justice, and how did 
this apply to cases in which families and family values were concerned?
The Athenian jury was exclusively male and its jurors received three obols 
a day for their service. The jury consisted mostly of peasant-farmers, the great 
bulk of the Athenian citizen population, for whom the opportunity to receive 
cash in hand made jury duty an appealing and financially rewarding prospect.27 
The connection between economic and judicial power did not end there, 
however. The consistent emphases on wealth and poverty and the good (civic) 
use of wealth in Isaeus' speeches supports the thesis that there was a significant 
decline in the political power of the poor in fourth century Athens.28 Although 
this thesis is difficult to assess, Isaeus' calls for pity for the poor(er) litigants 
suggests a real concern with economic disparity, and a potential bias of at least 
some of the jurors to the party with lesser means. An historical sense of social 
and economic justice had informed court decisions ever since Solon had set down 
his laws to protect the weak and poor from exploitation and to prevent "socially 
indefensible concentrations of landed property" 29. While the Athens of Isaeus 
possessed a stability that had been lacking in the days of the revered lawgiver, 
the poor may have attempted to combat a perceived decline in their power by 
condemning the rich(er) party in court. The concern for justice in tangible 
economic terms and any bias resulting from a decline in political power would 
have been manifested in an inheritance trial, in which financial concerns were 
central.
The jurors' own inheritance interests, pity, and the characters of the 
litigants were important factors in the jury's decision as well.^  ^The jury was, 
however, specifically compelled to consider justice and the laws in coming to a 
verdict. Each juror took solemn oaths to that effect, and these were reinforced by 
references to them by the logographoi. Isaeus makes such reminders in all but two 
of his speeches, and they give us a clear idea of the loftier influences to which the
27See Todd (1990a) 160,168-169 on the appeal of three obols a day for those making their living 
outside of the cash economy and the peasant-farmer values of the court as a whole. Dover (1974) 
113-114 hypothesises an exaggeration of the importance of farming and farming values in the 
sources, and argues 34-35 for a "fairly prosperous" juror or a poorer juror with pretenses to the 
"fairly prosperous" juror's values.
28Todd (1990a) 149-150.
29xodd and Millett (1990) 10.
^®"Your own interest": 1.40, 44; characters of opponents (stated specifically): 4.27; pity: 2.44; 5.35; 
9.35,37; 11.38.
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jury was subject and which the litigant could claim benefited him. Isaeus 
commands the jury to give their verdicts according to justice (tà ôiKaia), the laws 
(ol vogoi), and the oaths (ol opKoi) in four speeches/^ the laws and justice in 
two,^2 justice alone in four,^  ^justice and the oaths in one,^4 and "what happened" 
in one.^  ^ In 9.35, Isaeus claims that justice alone should influence the jury; the 
jurors should be intent upon nothing else. The actual oath that the jurors swore is 
unclear, but an attempted reformulation has recently been made, and there is 
solid evidence to show that the jurors were instructed to "use their best 
judgement" when the laws themselves did not make clear the right decision.^^
Justice, however, could easily be confused or made ambiguous, and in 
many inheritance trials there was no necessarily "right" or "just" decision, merely 
a decision in favour of one p a r t y . ^ 7  The adversarial legal system that developed 
in Athens made possible the profession of logographos, and this in turn created a 
client-centred approach to the law that valued victory over justice. Persuasion or 
the infliction of maximum damage on the ripT) of an opponent took precedence 
over the consistent use of principles and stricture in the forensic arena. There was 
no duty or commitment to presenting cases consistent with either custom or 
written law on behalf of the logographos: it was up to the jury to take these things 
into consideration. As a master rhetorician, Isaeus was a skilled manipulator of 
the law, custom, and the legal system. He chastises opponents for rhetorical 
conventions he himself utilised and he used strategies in one speech that he 
roundly condemned in others. Later chapters will expose his clever plots to win 
over a jury. What is important to note here is that as valued as written law and 
custom were as vehicles for the attainment of justice in Athens, rhetoric.
312.47,4.31,6.65,8.46.
321.26,9.35.
331.49-50,4.23,7.45,9.35.
3411.18.
338.4, 12.
3^Scafuro (1997) 50 quotes J. F. Cronin’s translation of M. Fraenkel's reformulation of the oath 
taken annually by jurors on the Adrettos: "I shall vote according to the laws and the decrees of 
the Athenian people and the Council of the Five Hundred, but concerning things about which 
there are no laws, I shall decide to the best of my judgment, neither with favour nor enmity". The 
fullest citation in the sources is Dem. 24. 149-151; the latter part of the reformulation quoted 
above comes from Dem. 20.118,23.96, and 39.40. See also Arist. Rhet. 1.1374a26-b23 on awareness 
of "justice ÜTat goes beyond the written law".
37 Consider Todd (1990 b) 172: "an Athenian trial is an adversarial and not an inquisitive 
procedure: the jury are not there to find out the truth, but to decide which of two theses they find 
preferable".
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persuasion, and personal gain were also valued, and nowhere does this reveal 
itself more clearly than in the courts.
Isaeus's law court was governed by a different ethos than the law court of 
today. The oral nature of Athenian society, the incipient acceptance of writing as 
a legal tool, the procedure of the trial, and the economic and philosophical 
origins of Athenian law ensured this. In a court where there was no judge and 
any evidence was admissible, justice as law enforcement could never exist. As long 
as we lack the means precisely to evaluate the standard of judgement in the 
fourth century law court, the subtlety and elusiveness of Athenian justice will 
continue to remain both fascinating and frustrating.
The Familial and Gender Contexts; Background on Athenian Kinship
Implicit in our investigation is the assumption that inheritance and family 
were closely related, and that inheritance cases can reveal to us the workings of 
the Athenian family. There was no Greek word for "family" or "nuclear family", 
only oikos, "household", and genos, "kin-group" or "bloodline". We are not dealing 
with representations of families per se in Isaeus, but, rather, with groups of 
people contesting each other’s right to an estate; the primary conflict to be settled 
in each case is one of property transmission, not one of family relationships. 
What, then, do we mean by "family"? How does this apply to Isaeus, and to 
Athens in general? Are we looking for something that existed in neither? Is 
"family" an idea or concept that is culture-specific, a social construct? These are 
essential questions to ask, and although satisfactory answers may not be 
forthcoming, neglecting them would compromise any family-oriented 
investigation into Isaeus' work. Defining or describing the "family" in the context 
of inheritance is a difficult undertaking.
It is, nevertheless, worthwhile, and while the picture we get of "family" 
life, however detailed, will only be partial at best, it is a picture of how 
individuals related by blood and connected by emotional, physical, and spatial 
ties interacted. For that reason, we can legitimately call our study one that deals 
with the family, provided that we keep in mind it is the lens of "our family" 
through which we look. As long as we impose our idea of a family upon Isaeus, 
we will fail; we will succeed if we realise that the systems of ties that bind in our 
society and those that bound in his are necessarily different, a major part of our 
undertaking being to define or describe the system that existed in Athens. The 
social and historical evidence will validate the linguistic evidence: "our family"
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did not exist in Athens, and living in a "family" there meant not just living in a 
different unit or construct, but living differently.
Inheritance law is particularly suited as a filter for gender relations. Issues 
of birth, marriage, legitimacy, and adoption are central in trials concerned with 
the passage of money and assets from one family member to another. As 
opposed to other trials in Athens, women played a fundamental role in 
inheritance trials. They themselves could not directly participate in the law court 
proceedings, but their critical place in every family tree mandated that they 
would be involved, if only by procreative capacity, in every inheritance case. 
While Isaeus givers us only a small glimpse into the infinity of tasks and duties 
that characterised the life of a citizen woman in Classical Athens, he gives us a 
much more significant glimpse into their relations with their fathers, sons, 
husbands, and brothers.
There are three main limitations that restrict the effectiveness of 
investigating Isaeus through the lens of gender relations. First, the evidence is 
one-sided: few women were found in the Athenian court room, and none served 
on the juries or wrote speeches presented in it. Everything we have is from a 
male perspective. Second, the evidence is scanty: the vast majority of Isaeus' 
speeches deal with interactions between males, and those between males and 
females are almost always between relatives. There is a general anonymity of 
women in Isaeus, and the only two women named repeatedly are accused of 
having lived the lives of courtesans or prostitutes .38 Third, the evidence is 
chronologically one-dimensional: a court speech may provide a glimpse into a 
relation but ignores the change and evolution in interactions that is inevitable in 
any family or relationship. We see simply an interaction or series of interactions 
in one time and one place, all of them representations, found in the form they 
possess not because they truthfully reflected family dynamics, but because they 
contributed to the success of the case in question.
My Approach
Plumbing the depths of the family and gender relations in Classical 
Athens is a challenging task. There is no shortage of recent examinations of the 
family, women, and Athenian la w ,3 9  and though my work will draw extensively
38phile in speech 3 and Alee in speech 6. See Chapter Three and Appendix.
39gee, for example, Cox (1998), Patterson (1998), Cohen (1994), Sealey (1990), Just (1989), and 
Schapps (1979).
20
on those examinations, it will also take a more narrowly focused approach, 
centred on the forensic context of inheritance conflicts. As opposed to a general 
investigation of the family or women's economic or legal rights in Classical 
Athens, this dissertation deals exclusively with evidence by one author, written 
for one kind of legal conflict in one specific context. Such narrowness, while 
limiting our ability to make broad conclusions, has the advantage of penetrating 
more deeply into a fundamental source of evidence for our topic and thus reveals 
more clearly the limitations of its use in broader works.
There are four principles that define my approach to the study of forensic 
oratory, the family, and gender relations. The first regards legal statutes. In 
Athens, they were anything but absolute, and rarely the scholarly bedrock for 
which we might easily take them. Although tangible and concrete evidence for 
an investigation of societal mores, written law should not be overvalued; what is 
most significant is not what it states, but how that statement is used in court. 
Second, an awareness of the "organic relationship" between the law and its socio­
political context^  ^must always inform the conclusions we draw from Isaeus. But 
because we are blind (and deaf) to substantial aspects of that organic 
relationship, restraint and humility must characterise our approach. This is the 
third point. Rigorous analysis of a speech is warranted in order to understand its 
complexities, but must be done with the understanding that many potentially 
decisive variables are beyond our reach. Such analyses can raise questions about 
Isaeus' strategy in a case, compare his consistency between cases, and present 
questions about how a jury might have responded to them; they cannot lead us 
to a position from which we can confidently pronounce the merits of a case and 
the legal actions that preceded it. We must remember that we only have one side 
of each case, the outcome of each case is usually unknown, and the speeches 
could well have been edited after their use in court. This last point is particularly 
important, as it casts Isaeus in the dubious roles of the self-conscious informant 
and the businessman advertising his skills and abilities to future c lien ts.E ven
^^That tlie law is nourished on tlie social, economic, and political issues of society, see Todd and 
Millett (1990). Note especially 10, "the law has an organic relationship with its social and political 
context" and 15, "questions about Athenian law are in the last resort anthropological questions 
about the Athenians".
^^Bourdieu (1977) 37,196 cautions against the full acceptance of self-conscious informers. Isaeus 
published his speeches with the intention of building a reputation for himself—engaging in a 
literary p h ilo tim ia -b o th  for present and future generations. Wevers’ (1969) 95 view of Isaeus in 
this regard is misguided: Isaeus, like other writers, did  write for posterity, "with an eye on what 
later generations would say of him". This is precisely why he published his speeches. Those "late
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obiter dicta or seemingly incidental remarks are not safe ground on which to 
stand, as a deliberate subtlety was part of Isaeus' logographic skill. We simply 
cannot say that a decision was "a manifest miscarriage of justice", an argument 
"sailing very near the wind",^  ^ or that one party "scarcely had a chance of 
winning".43 Only an Athenian juror would have had the capacity to make such a 
statement. Finally, a wide perspective, incorporating historical and philological 
as well as anthropological and sociological approaches, is important if we are to 
gain a balanced view of the Classical family and the gender relations within it.
There are many questions to ask and many reasons for being sceptical. 
But enough with these methodological issues; over-concern with them can lead 
to investigative paralysis. It is now time to act on the evidence. What do the 
speeches of Isaeus tell us about the family and gender relations in Classical 
Athens?
generations" were both later generations of clients and later generations of general readers. To 
say that "the total view of society unconsciously presented by Isaeus is certainly not distorted" is 
to neglect some of die most fundamental aspects of forensic oratory. There is no "total view of 
society" in Isaeus, he presented nothing "unconsciously", and much of it was, we can be sure, 
deliberately "distorted". See Dover (1968) 168-170 on the pre-publication "touching up" of 
Aeschines's and Demosthenes's speeches.
^^Pronouncements such as these characterized Wyse's analysis (1904:671,562).
^ I^sager and Hansen (1975) 149.
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Chapter Two 
CONCEPTIONS OF THE FAMILY IN ISAEUS
Our investigation of the family in Isaeus will begin with an examination 
of how a family and its interactions were constructed on a conceptual level. 
Whereas chapters three, four, and five will focus on more specific relations 
within Athenian families, this chapter will focus on establishing some of the 
principles upon which those relations were based. It will take a more general 
approach, investigating some of the broader definitions and conceptions of the 
Classical Athenian family.
We will begin with a look at Isaeus's first speech. On The Estate of 
Cleonymus, and the role of the anchisteia in defining succession, as well as 
"exceptional" circumstances, such as childlessness, for which custom and law 
provided "exceptional" rules. We will also investigate On The Estate of Ciron, 
Isaeus's eighth speech, examining what arguments for lineal and collateral 
descent can tell us about the Athenian family. An analysis of Isaeus' rhetoric will 
be central to both, demonstrating the significance of the forensic context in 
mitigating our perception and understanding of the families represented and the 
Athenian family in general. It is important to remember that the families into 
whose lives we are penetrating were the wealthy elite of society, and, as a result, 
any view of "the Athenian family in general" is somewhat, though not 
completely, compromised. The chapter will conclude with an exposition of what 
these speeches and the principles used to establish and support the arguments in 
them can tell us about the development of Athenian law and society.
Isaeus 1: Affinity, Affection, and Adoption
The case that Isaeus argues in his first speech is directly dependent on an 
acknowledged understanding of succession as founded in affinity and affection, 
the closeness of an individual to another in blood and the emotional ties that 
bind them. Isaeus states this explicitly in 1.17: "if the claimants can prove...that 
they are nearer in blood (t^ yévei) and in friendship to the deceased, all other 
arguments are superfluous", and in 1.37: "if succession is based on the anchisteia 
of kinship (Ôià xfiv yévouç àvxioT:eiav)...or existing friendship ". It is implied in 
1.41: "For you all surely know what closeness in blood (xov yévouç) is; one cannot 
misrepresent it to you", and reiterated in 1.45: "he was a next-of-kin (yévet
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Ttpoai^ Kcov èYYwdTco) and most closely bound to us by ties of affection, for which 
reasons the laws have given him the right of succession". Isaeus establishes the 
authority of to yévoq in deciding a question of inheritance; the individual who 
was closest by blood had the rightful claim to the award. Isaeus' reasoning is 
first and foremost bloodline reasoning. Additionally, shared blood engendered 
the right kinds of feelings. Closest kindred were those kinder and more 
considerate to an individual (1.29). Affinity and affection were the two criteria for 
inheriting property and dictated a proper succession.
Legal precedent supported Isaeus' criteria and established them as part of 
an accepted custom. He claims "it would be very strange if in all other cases you 
were to vote in favour of those who prove themselves nearer either in kinship (ii 
Y8V81) or in friendship" (1.38) and "It is only right, gentlemen, that you should—as 
you do—deliver your verdict on account of affinity (Ôià xfiv ovyyéveiav) and the 
true facts of the case to those who claim by right of kinship (Kara yévoç) rather 
than those who claim by right of testament" (1.41). Athenian juries had 
consistently made a claim Karà yevoç victorious; it was a valued principle of 
family law, and the significant bias towards it and against wills of the kind that 
Isaeus' opponent used to support his claim made it the significant component of 
Isaeus' case. Because Cleonymus was the plaintiffs' next of kin, supported and 
raised them as children (1.1,12, 28-29), and lived "on terms of greater intimacy" 
with them than anyone else (1.4, 30), the plaintiffs necessarily deserved to be 
awarded his estate.
There was an understood reciprocity to such a close kin relationship. The 
plaintiffs had a responsibility to support Cleonymus' father, their grandfather, if 
he were old and poor, as well as to marry Cleonymus' daughters or find 
husbands and provide dowries for them if Cleonymus himself died (1.39). Their 
position as next of kin and personal sense of honour dictated this: "the claims of 
kinship, the laws, and public opinion in Athens would have forced us to do this 
or else become liable to heavy punishment and extreme disgrace". This 
responsibility carried with it the privilege of inheritance, stated explicitly in the 
same passage. The sharing of a man's misfortunes mandated an equal sharing of 
his inheritance.
The reciprocity of the family relationship was conceived in terms of 
privilege and responsibility that blended the ethical and financial. It could also be 
conceived in strictly financial terms, as a trade-off between two individuals, or, 
as above, between two families. "Whom, gentlemen, could he have wished to
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have it rather than those to whom in his lifetime he gave more assistance out of 
his private means than to anyone else?" (1.27). Had the plaintiffs' oikos become 
extinct, Isaeus argues, Cleonymus could claim to be the rightful heir, and now 
that Cleonymus' oikos is extinct it is only right that the converse be true. "I think 
that you yourselves consider it your right to inherit—and feel a grievance if you 
do not do so—from those who have a claim to inherit from you...for it is only fair 
that those should possess his property from whom he had a right to inherit." 
(1.44). Reciprocity, the ability to give and receive an inheritance from a kin, 
defined one's relationship to a relative: "Thus, gentlemen, you will find us being 
his relatives (olKeioua) in each of two ways, both in giving (ôoûvai) and in taking 
(XaPeXv)" (1.47).
An Athenian inheritance, then, was taken by individuals who were bound 
by the ethical and financial ties of blood relationship and the affection that 
followed it. Affection was an appropriate rationale for inheritance only in the 
context of affinity, as a derivative of it. Affinity alone was primary, Isaeus 
suggests, and as defined by the anchisteia, the legal definition of those who were 
connected by blood to an individual and the priority given to them for claiming 
an inheritance, the genos was the customary and legal concept that determined 
inheritance and dictated pursuant affection. The Athenian family was 
concretely founded in biology, and this criterion, and the secondary emphasis on 
affection, demonstrate that inheritance was closely associated with our concept of 
"family", and that an investigation into succession can provide the kinds of 
insights for which we are looking.
Critiquing Isaeus 1
Isaeus seeks to present a "fair is fair" scenario in substantiating his client's 
claim to Cleonymus' estate. His emphases on the priority of kinship and the 
reciprocity of relationships give us an important glimpse into the expectations 
and ideals that guided family relations in fourth century Athens. Several points 
about his case warrant closer attention.
The first is that Isaeus' goal is to win an inheritance for his clients; the 
emphasis on the fairness of financial reciprocity detailed above should remind us 
that possession of an estate is the ultimate goal of this case. The representations 
of relationships are only means to that end, and as Cleonymus himself is dead, 
the speaker can say what he likes about his relationship with the deceased as 
long as he has witnesses to affirm his statements. Secondly, Isaeus does not
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prove what he set out to prove. The repetition of assertions of the plaintiffs' 
closeness to their uncle (1.4, 18, 20, 27, 30) reveals the significance that the jury 
gave such closeness, but the closeness itself was never conclusively 
demonstrated. All that Isaeus has told us is that the plaintiffs were raised and 
supported by Cleonymus (1.12-13); that "he looked after our interests as though 
they were our own" can hardly be assumed from the flimsy story about desiring 
to change the will in the plaintiffs' favour (1.13-14). Even supposing that this 
story was credible, if Cleonymus and his nephews had been on such good terms 
for so long, why had the will not been changed earlier? Thirdly, Isaeus resorts to 
arguments based on relative merit after arguing for the absolute merit of his 
clients' case. He includes assertions of Cleonymus' disfavour with Pherenicus 
(1.31-32) following his assertions of Cleonymus' affection for the nephews as well 
as examples of a lack of reciprocity between his opponents' and Cleonymus (1.45,
47) following assertions of the nephews' reciprocity with him. Such 
negative/relative arguments suggest that Isaeus lacked confidence in the 
positive/absolute arguments upon which he was so insistent. Neither Isaeus nor 
the jury was convinced that "all other arguments" were "superfluous". More than 
just an a definition of the family was needed for the verdict. Fourthly, a host of 
rhetorical devices, including generalisations about the handling of conflicts with 
relatives (1.19, 24), the implied equivalence of an extraordinary verdict with a 
wrong verdict (1.23,28,29,51), and the selective emphasis on insanity as the only 
explanation for a decision not fitting the criteria he himself has laid out for 
testamentary adoption (1.19-21), can be found in Isaeus' argument.
The overall generality and sentimentality of his case lead us to suspect 
that legal stricture was not on the side of the plaintiffs, and that this was, 
consequently, a weak legal case. Isaeus' final assurance that "we are not bringing 
a vexatious suit" (1.50) seems so out of place as to "protest too much". Most 
important to our investigation, however, is Isaeus' emphasis on the genos as the 
sole claim for inheriting. This is misleading. Testamentary adoption was legally 
and customarily valid in Athens (as demonstrated by Isaeus' attempts to show 
the falseness of his opponents' will in this case), so while inheritance may have 
been dependent on the anchisteia in most cases, in those where a male heir was 
lacking—exactly the scenario we have here—a citizen could execute his right to 
bequeath by will. The inheritance of kin via the anchisteia applied only by 
"default" in such a situation, but Isaeus implies that the anchisteia  was
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omnipotent, generalising its application from most inheritance cases to all of 
them.
Isaeus sought to give the impression that the principles of succession he 
promoted accorded effectively with legal stricture. Isaeus's stricture-based 
approach is evident in his utilisation of the paternal filial support nomoi of 1.39 
and the references to the anchisteia, the legal definition of kin. Yet, neither of these 
examples exhibits the direct support of stricture. Instead, they only demonstrate 
a similarity of principle, and thus mimic, but do not manifest, a direct 
application of law to the situation. They follow the same lateral legal reasoning of 
the reciprocal inheritability principle Isaeus mentions in 1.44, "it is only fair that 
those should possess the property from whom he had a right to inherit". Where 
Isaeus cannot claim ô vôgoç K e A - e u e i ,  he claims S i k u I o v  yap èm i, presumably, the 
next best thing.
Conclusions from Isaeus 1
Consequently, there were three legal approaches to an inheritance case 
(and most likely, to all cases): one that appealed to principles of custom and legal 
precedent, one that appealed to legal principle,^ and one that appealed to the 
specifics of written law. Isaeus specifically mentions the importance of all in his 
case. His "normative" statements in 1.38 and 1.41, detailed above, are clear 
appeals to past patterns of legal decision and represent an awareness of and 
appeal to precedent (or at least a concept of it) in the Athenian courtroom. His 
appeal to legal principle infuses the lateral law and reciprocity reasoning of 1.39 
and 1.44. His statements in 1.26: "our opponents...are trying to persuade you to 
give a verdict which is contrary to the laws and justice", 1.35: "we can show to be 
contrary both to the law and to justice", and 1,40: "Your verdict, then, will not be 
just or ...in harmony with the law " indicates that Athenian jurors were concerned 
with abiding by the strictures of written law. As Isaeus could argue effectively on 
the bases of principle and precedent, and not on the basis of stricture, we see that 
a logographos may only appear to utilise all approaches in a case, manipulating his
^Todd (1993) 13 doubts whether legal principles were ever consciously articulated in Athens. 
Although the sources do not include any systematic statement of legal principles, they do lie 
embedded in the law; our task is precisely to discover and articulate them. The legal principles he 
conceives of may be grander than the principles Isaeus uses here, but those grander principles are 
themselves derived from a conception of the law and whatever area of life that law regulates. 
Neither a legal system nor those other areas of life can exist without a foundation of principles, 
especially not if "the law is one of the most significant ways in which human beings regulate and 
indeed conceptualise their social relations" (10).
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presentation of the law to give the impression of full legal corroboration for his 
argument.
Isaeus' approach reveals multiple views of the law; it also reveals multiple 
views of the family. Athenians clearly believed that kinship defined the family 
and dictated inheritance, but they also believed that family and inheritance could 
possess non-kin elements. The practicalities of life in Classical Athens made 
adoption a necessity, as the survival of children in Athens was a problem,^ and 
provisions had to be made if preservation of the oikos was the preeminent 
concern. Yet, while kinship may have been the "rule" or "norm" while adoption 
was an "exception", it is an important point in our investigation because it 
represents a significant conceptual shift. The adoption of a son raised an 
important ideological challenge to the xaxa yevoç notion of the family: the 
adopted son was clearly not connected in this fundamental way, but was allowed 
to inherit his father's estate and carry on his blood as if he possessed it by birth. 
He severed his link with his biological family (9.2, 33), he was guaranteed an 
inheritance equal to that of a biological son (6.63), he performed the religious 
services for the father and his father's ancestors (9.7), and took his father's place 
in civic and religious activities (9.13).
The conceptual shift, however, was itself limited, and its limitation 
underscores the priority of kin relations in the family. The estate an adopted son 
inherited reverted to the anchisteia if he did not produce a legitimate biological 
child. The adopted son's full membership in the oikos, manifested in his 
entitlement to all the rights of a biological son, was contingent on this point. Only 
when a biological son was lacking would the law give priority to affection over 
affinity, and only once within a two generation span. The Athenian family was a 
biological unit cormected through time and across space by common blood with 
occasional, unigenerational "non-blooded" links.
Isaeus' first case provides an enlightening look into concepts of the family, 
forensic methodology, and legal values. As our investigation shows, "other 
arguments" were not only anything but "superfluous" to cases of family law, 
they were essential. Isaeus' case in speech 1 was completely dependent on one 
view of the family and a legal tradition that supported that view, and it reveals 
the deliberate use of such a bias to cloud an opposing argument with a strong
^Isager (1982) 96. She also notes (89) the advanced ages of both adopters and adoptees as 
evidence of mutual insurance: the adopter wanted to ensure the survivability of the adoptee, and 
the adoptee’s family wanted to ensure the survival of a brother or sister in his place.
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legal position. It also reveals a belief in the adherence to written law, and at the 
same time, a lack of faith in the written documents that were both the end of such 
a law and essential to the preservation of a family and its material possessions.
Isaeus 8: Lineal versus Collateral Descent
Speech 8 presents an image of the family painted both in private and 
public terms and reveals the significance of the family’s public activities as 
justifications for legitimacy and inheritance. Isaeus devotes twenty-two sections 
(8.7-8.29) to examples of the public interactions of the various members of the 
family and follows it with six sections (8.30-35) detailing the customary private 
handling of a family's inheritance. What are the particulars of this public and 
private interaction?
First, weddings as great celebrations. Both the father and the groom 
would provide a wedding-feast at the marriage of a daughter (8.8-9), and the 
groom would provide for a wedding banquet as well (8.18-19); these and the 
eyyuT) ceremony itself would be attended by the close friends of the father and 
groom, who, as ol èyyuT|odgevoi, "those who betrothed her", played some active 
role in the ceremony and would willingly attest to the fact in court (8.13-14). The 
father would provide a dowry of raiment and jewelry worth twenty-five minae 
at his daughter's first marriage and, having received her back into his oikos upon 
the death of her husband, would give her in a second marriage with a dowry of a 
thousand drachmae and a second wedding-feast (8.7-10).
Second, numerous domestic and civic religious festivals, attended by 
multiple generations, if not all generations, of the family. The grandfather took 
his grandchildren to the Dionysia and watched the public spectacles with them at 
his side, and they always attended ai èoprai with him at his house. Fie invited his 
grandchildren to all the sacrifices he made, whether large or small, and they 
were present with him at especially important family festivals, including the one 
devoted to Zeus Ctesius, a closed ceremony for members of the oikos exclusively 
(8.15-16).
Finally, more specific and exclusive religious and civic events supervised 
or attended by only one or two members of the family. The wives of a man's 
fellow demesmen might elect his wife to preside over the Thesmophoria (8.18- 
19), the annual, women-only Athenian religious festival, and the rightful heir 
directed the funeral procession of a deceased male and supervised the expenses 
of it (8.21-26,39). A father forged a bond with his son at his presentation to the
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phratry, in which the father gave the oath of legitimacy in the presence of his 
fellow phrateres (8.19).
The Athenian family was involved in public, semi-public, and private 
activities together, all of which were attended by at least several people, many of 
which were attended by dozens, if not hundreds. Large occasions, even if 
"private" in the sense that they were by invitation only, played an important role 
in the family's life and, more importantly for Isaeus, could be used as proof that 
the family in question was one composed of fully legitimate members.^ The 
magnitude of a family gathering was essential for its ability to provide ample 
witnesses in any future forensic dispute: depositions and witness to the veracity 
of the events described were given in 8.13-14, 17, and 20. Legitimacy dictated 
public interaction and vice versa. Isaeus emphasises this explicitly in 8.18, "Now 
it is not only from these proofs that our mother is clearly shown to be the 
legitimate daughter of Ciron", and 8.20, "Yet do not for a moment suppose that, if 
our mother had been such as our opponents allege, our father would have...; or 
that the wives of the demesmen would have... or that the wardsmen would 
have...if it had not been universally admitted that our mother was a legitimate 
daughter of Ciron". The lineal nature of this legitimacy is significant: "Yet if he 
had not regarded us as his daughter's children and seen in us his only surviving 
lineal descendants, he would have done none of these things" (8.17).
A more detailed exposition of the virtues of lineal descent follows, and is 
Isaeus' central argument for his clients' claim to the estate in question. A lineal 
descendant (ëKyovoç) deserved favour over a collateral descendant (auyyevqç) 
because first, a collateral descendant was not closer to a lineal descendant in the 
anchisteia (8.30), and second, a daughter was closer in the family (èYymépo) toû 
yévouç) to her father than the father's brother, and it followed that a daughter's 
children must have been closer than the brother's children (8.33). Furthermore, 
the epikleros law dictated that the sons of a mother take control of her property as 
opposed to the husband's brother who would marry her, so a mother's children 
were favoured as heirs over the brother-in-law and his children (8.31). The same
^The distinction between public and private spheres has been an important issue in recent 
examinations of Classical Athenian life and gender relations. Isaeus 8 demonstrates that the 
boundary between the spheres was blurred: the concern with witnesses and legitimacy especially 
reveal the more subtle "private" nature of public events and "public" nature of private events. 
There is clearly a concern with readiness for any future forensic action in family-oriented 
activities. The "individual consciousness of a dichotomy between the two spheres", to quote Sally 
Humphries, was not as strong or as clear as we would assume. See Humphries (1983) xii, 1-37, 
Foxhall (1989) 23,28-30, and Patterson (1998) 108-132,157-179.
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principle is found in the parental neglect law, Isaeus argues, which mandates the 
responsibility for the care of a grandparent to his grandchildren and not to his 
nephews; the reasoning of reciprocity ensured that the grandchildren would 
inherit their grandparents' property. There existed a bond of support and 
inheritance between the source of a family (dpxfi roû y é v o ' u ç )  and their lineal 
descendants ( o i  è K y ô v o i )  that assumed the lineal transmission of an estate (8.32). 
That this practice was universal and incontrovertible (8.34) leads us to the 
conclusion that the linear transmission of property through the direct bloodline 
of offspring guided Athenian inheritance and family legislation.
In Isaeus' picture of the Athenian family in speech 8, legitimacy, lineality, 
inheritance, and participation in public spectacle were inextricably bound 
together. Grandparents and grandchildren supported each other, the latter's gift 
of religious, civic, and financial support the logical and legal reciprocation of the 
gift of inheritance. In public and in private, the oldest generation of a family had 
a special relationship with the youngest that had an unquestioned financial 
consequence.
Critiquing Isaeus 8
A closer investigation of the structure and methodology of the speech 
reveals the inadequacy of this image in both general and specific terms and the 
complexities of family law as it was conceptualised and practised in Athens. The 
initial problem is stylistic: Isaeus' tone is so non-committal that it immediately 
casts suspicion on the validity of the argument. Isaeus nowhere proves his own 
advantage over his opponents, only the lack of his opponents' advantage over 
him, leaving open the distinct possibility that both had an equal claim. He states 
that he will demonstrate his clients' right to claim over their opponents (8.6, 30), 
but nowhere does he directly state or prove that lineal descendants have direct 
superiority over collaterals. Instead, he only states that it was very clear that 
collaterals were not nearer in the anchisteia than lineals (8.30). He ends his parental 
neglect argument with a rhetorical question, and repeats the technique in his 
"analysis" of family relationships, which he concludes with an argument valid 
only out of deductive reasoning. He never says outright that his opponents 
deserve the claim because of the applicability of lineal descent in this case, only 
"it is obvious that we and not our opponents have the right to succeed to the 
estate" (8.31) and "...our opponent should be the heir and not we? Surely it cannot 
be right" (8.32).
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The second problem is structural: why is the argument for lineal descent, 
the seemingly deciding issue in the case, given such short shrift in the speech as a 
whole? The argument presented here seems essential to the case, yet it occupies 
a mere six sections out of a total of forty-six; even the section devoted to the 
defamation of Diodes, the alleged third-party instigator of the whole conflict, 
takes up more space. The only section of the speech that speaks for the plaintiffs' 
advantage in the case is relatively tiny. Why?
The answer lies in the relative strength of the opposition's argument . 
While the inheritance pattern Isaeus emphasises was from grandparents to their 
grandchildren through their children—from the first generation to the third via 
the second—the case in speech 8 is one in which the grandfather, Ciron, outlived 
his own children. There were no parents through which to inherit the 
grandparents' estate. The anchisteia mandated that, in the absence of children, the 
first right of succession went to the (grand)father's brother. This is the 
opposition's primary argument. Legal stricture dictated collateral descent for the 
family of speech 8, as it did in speech 1. Isaeus has deliberately kept the role of 
the parents in the case ambiguous;^ nowhere is there a reference to the direct 
lineal right of grandchildren to inherit through a grandparent. This one 
generation gap makes a significant difference in Athenian family law, and it is 
the fundamental aspect of Isaeus' argument in speech 11, On The Estate of 
Hagnias. In that case, Isaeus argues that a man’s rightful claim could not be 
passed on to his son after his death specifically because the son fell outside of the 
relationships defined by the anchisteia (11.11-12).
Isaeus was compelled to keep his main argument short and ambiguous: 
the longer he drew it out, the more he would risk a juror's thoughtful 
examination of his fallacious reasoning. Asking forgiveness for "repeating 
tiresome truths" was Isaeus' way both of ingratiating himself to the jury by 
preventing a further waste of their time and of moving into the defamation of 
Diodes, about which he could speak more strongly and convincingly. The 
weakness of his central argument is precisely why no case such as this had ever 
been brought before (8.34).
 ^ Isaeus refers only to oi eKYOvoi "the descendents" in the first part of the argument (8.30) and 
keeps the analysis of family relationships in the final part (8.33-34) to one generation.
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Conclusions from Isaeus 8
While we can trust Isaeus* emphasis on the importance and prevalence of 
lineal descent in dictating inheritance in Classical Athens, we must give collateral 
descent its due. The anchisteia mandated collateral descent in situations where 
there was no child to directly inherit, and the frequency of this general situation 
(the case of a father outliving his son, specifically, was much less frequent) in 
Athens, with its relatively high infant mortality rate and regular warfare, meant 
that this was a familiar scenario. A conflict between lineal and collateral descent 
did exist in Athens, and, although it was not a valid aspect of this case, it could 
be utilised in court to further the interests of a plaintiff. Brothers, and, to a lesser 
extent, sisters, and their children had an important place in the scheme of 
succession, and, therefore, in family life.
There are numerous similarities between Isaeus' first and eighth speeches. 
As in speech 1, Isaeus abstracts the exceptional nature of his case, presenting it 
as one that should fall into line with the predominant, normative custom. Thus 
his claim to "repeating truths so universal" and "the incontrovertible title of lineal 
descent" by which "you all inherit the property of your fathers...". There is little 
doubt that the majority of jurors received their inheritance via a direct and 
unquestioned inheritance from their fathers; in no way, however, did that make 
lineal descent "universal" and "incontrovertible". The anchisteia is again a focal 
point, as are the emphases on lateral legal reasoning and precedent. Isaeus begins 
the section dealing with lineal descent by stating, "I think it is already very clear 
to you that those who grew up with a man are not closer in the anchisteia 
(èyyurépm raiç àyxioTelaiç) than those who are descended from him" (8.30). His 
argument that the epikleros and parental neglect laws support this assertion are 
well-reasoned: by all due "blood" logic, grandchildren should, and did, he 
reminds us, inherit their grandparents' property. Precedent is again on his side, 
or appears to be.
Yet, he is again deprived of laws directly applicable to his case. 
Nominally arguments in stricture, his use of the epikleros and parental neglect 
laws in 8.31 and 8.32, as in speech 1, are principle arguments, relying on lateral, 
not direct, legal reasoning. A mere approximation of the support of legal 
stricture, these laws have only a similar logic that can be applied, not an actual 
mandate or rule, leaving Isaeus' claim to prove his case am&v rmv vogcov (8.30) 
empty. Isaeus utilises legal arguments based on principle when he cannot utilise 
legal arguments based on stricture.
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Conclusion
The issues revealed in speeches 1 and 8 underscore the conceptual 
development of the Athenians in the fields of family and the law. In the fourth 
century, they tackled the challenges found in two of the most important areas of 
their lives in a complex and sophisticated manner, developing flexible structures 
for overcoming those challenges. As their democracy developed, they honed 
their problem-solving skills, communally—with an accessible and flexible system 
of law, familially-with a flexible means of perpetuating the oikoi of the polis, and 
individually—with a utilisation of the court to secure an citizen's interests. The 
diversity which characterised the image of the family and the approach to 
solving its economic problems reflected the diversity of the growing democracy's 
legal and ideological foundations. Fourth century Athens lacked one coherent 
and unified concept of the family as it lacked one coherent and unified concept of 
the law: collateral and lineal descent, affine and non-affine succession, legal 
stricture and legal principle each represented different approaches to and 
conceptions of the family and the law. A diversity of values made possible the 
different solutions that could be utilised to solve or remedy the challenges facing 
a family, and this diversity of values regarding the family was itself valued.
The awareness of this diversity, however, generated a manipulation of it, 
and this manipulation, in turn, generated and directly facilitated familial conflict. 
A multiplicity of conceptions of the family and the law provided a multiplicity of 
options for making a claim to an estate in court. Athens was fertile ground for 
the promotion of individual interests, especially those linked to inheritance. The 
availability of logographoi, whose job was specifically to facilitate that self­
promotion, fertilised Athens for familial conflict to an even greater degree. The 
speech-writer's raison d'etre was conflict: he was compensated to further the 
direct opposition of one family member to another in court. The generation and 
facilitation of the means of conflict was his job, so it was in his interest to utilise 
the flexibility and diversity of Athenian legal and familial systems and to push 
them as far as they could go in securing his client's interests. In his hands, the law 
and the family became tools with which to provide a client with what he desired. 
If conflict resolution was the origin and ideal of Athenian law, it was significantly 
compromised, if not destroyed, with the arrival of the professional speech-writer. 
The profession of logographos was itself a threat to the Athenian family.
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Chapter Three 
SEXUAL RELATIONS
Legitimacy was a significant factor in determining succession in fourth 
century inheritance cases, and in examining legitimacy and sucession, this 
chapter will examine sexual relationships and their regulation in Athenian 
society. We will first examine the general sexual culture of Athens, 
combining information regarding sexual relations from Isaeus' speeches with 
a few pertinent passages from other sources. We will then investigate Isaeus' 
third speech. On The Estate of Pyrrhus, more specifically, synthesising the 
speech's explicit and implicit presentation of sexual relations to comment on 
the sexual divisions within the citizenry, how this contributes to the sexual 
structure of Athenian society, and the influence of both on forensic disputes.
Sexual Relationships in Athens: Background Information from Isaeus
Before examining questions of legitimacy and succession specifically, 
we need to have an overall picture of the sexual relationships available to 
Athenian citizens and the principles upon which they were based. What can 
the speeches of Isaeus tell us about the general sexual ethos of Athens?
Procreation , pleasure, and paternity
We must begin with the oikos. The oikos was the integral institution of 
Athenian society, the basic familial and economic unit, and an important 
political unit. Its preservation, through the production of legitimate children, 
was of the highest concern to the Athenian citizenry, and was considered a 
religious, and even political, duty. On a practical level, children were heirs 
who provided material support and comfort to parents in old age (12.2-3). On 
a more abstract level, they had important religious duties to fulfill. "All men 
take precautions to prevent their families from becoming extinct" exclaims the 
speaker of Isaeus 7: they ensure that they have children to perform the 
familial sacrifices and carry out the proper rites over their tombs (7.30-31). 
This is reiterated in speech 2: a good citizen deserved a successor to honour 
his family cults and perform the annual rites necessary to the religious health 
of his family (2.10, 12, 46). To be denied this would be a degrading injustice 
(2.46). Consequently, a childless citizen approached old age with 
apprehension (2.7); his condition was an evil that should not have been 
unnecessarily shared with a wife who was still of child-bearing age (2.8), and
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adoption, his only consolation left in life (2.13), was a specific remedy for his 
"dry" oikos (2.10, 6.5).:
The need to prevent the extinction of oikoi was not a solely private 
matter. Both extended families and the polis more generally had 
responsibilities to provide children for the childless. It was an insult to one's 
paternal gods and the gods of the city to attempt to deprive a relative of 
children (2.1); any family member that would allow another's oikos to die out 
neglected his duty and was a shameful and irreligious reprobate (7.31, 2.46).  ^
This accusation, a common one levied against opponents in inheritance 
claims, worked on a fear of wiping out not just the lineage but also the very 
name of a citizen (2.37, 47), and its repetition in speech 2^  and speech 7^  
reflects the force that such a fear carried in Athens. As the wealthier oikoi of 
the polis provided the trierarchies that supported the Athenian empire, the 
state had a vested interest in preserving these households in particular (7.32). 
The common good relied on private and public maintenance of oikoi, and the 
archon himself was charged with ensuring their preservation (7.30).
Procreation was one major objective of sexual relationships in Athens. 
Pleasure was another. Demosthenes articulates this quite clearly: "We have 
mistresses (é-raipai) for the sake of pleasure, concubines (TcaXXuKal) for the 
daily care of our body, and wives (yuvdiKeq) for the purpose of begetting 
legitimate children and having a reliable guardian of the contents of our 
house."  ^To this we can add prostitutes (îcôpvai) and slaves. As both TtaXXuKai 
and slaves were usually resident within the oikos, Athenian men not only 
pursued sexual contact with women other than those with whom they 
intended to produce children, they did so within the walls of their own
^Note Lacey (1968) 118: "A man's oikos provided both his place in the citizen body and what 
measure of social security tliere was." Thus, the state intervened to ensure social security only 
for those who were, or could soon be, outside of an oikos: epikleroi, orphans, widows, and the 
elderly. For them, the security was secondary, and, necessarily, more fragile.
2 As the perpetuation of family ties and cults was an especially important concern, marriage 
and adoption were commonly enacted between the members of the same larger family. 
Cousins often married, and cousins and nephews were often adopted, in fourth century 
Atliens. Common ancestry and wealth are described as good reasons for the enactment of a 
marriage (7.11), and that a marriage, represented as a means for the strengthening of bonds 
between feuding relatives (7.12), with tliese advantages did not happen is represented as only 
resulting from the magnitude of envy between the fathers of the bride and groom (7.11-12). 
The closest young male relative was the first sought for in adoption (2.11), and adoption out 
of a (childless) wife's family was seen as a desirable substitute for a biological son (2.11). The 
father of the bride is represented as the most important person in the establishment of a 
marriage between a citizen man and woman. His friendship witli the groom was an 
important element in considering an agreement to marry (2.3-4).
^2.10,15,26-27,36,46.
47.30-31,43.
^Dem. 59.122.
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homes. A multiplicity of sexual realtionships was available to male citizens in 
Athens. Choice was a defining characteristic of the male sexual culture there.
That it was not a defining characteristic of female sexual culture was 
mandated by the Athenian concern with paternity. Oikoi were male 
structures, and the familial, religious, and financial traditions that 
characterised them originated in male lineages. The common blood that made 
an Athenian family a biological unit connected through time and across space 
was male blood, and where there was no biological son to succeed to an 
estate, provisions were made to ensure that a biological grandson would. An 
epikleros was a daughter who, in the absence of a legitimate male heir, 
inherited her father's estate; the deceased father’s nearest relative, usually his 
brother, had the right to claim her and her estate (3.64-66). When sons born 
from the sexual union of the daughter and relative came of age, they took 
control of the estate (8.31). As they possessed their grandfather’s blood 
through their mother, they were the legitimate heirs to the estate, the oikos of 
the deceased father having been successfully reestablished by them. The 
adoption of a son worked similarly: when adopted, the son was compelled to 
take as his wife any legitimate daughter of the adoptive father (3.41-42, 68). 
Any child produced from their sexual union would possess the deceased 
father's blood and thus preserve his oikos. An Athenian father's blood was 
guaranteed to be in the children who inherited the estate via his daughter. 
Sons were often adopted from within the extended family,^ so even if a father 
was completely childless, there could still exist common blood between him 
and his successor. The adoption of a son from outside the extended family in 
the same situation made the preservation of the oikos purely conceptual, 
although wholly legal and valid.^
How did this concern with paternity affect a woman's sexual liberty? 
As a child could be conceived from any sexual relationship, regardless of 
whether it was pursued for pleasure or procreation, allowing a woman the 
same sexual liberty as a man necessarily called into question the father of the 
child she bore. Assuring that a child possessed the paternal blood requisite 
to perpetuating the oikos meant assuring that the woman who bore him 
engaged in sexual contact with that child's father alone. The preservation of 
the oikos, of which succession was a part, depended on assured paternity.
^See note 2.
^This purely conceptual adoption, we can be assured, happened frequently enough. If 
adoption was the only comfort a childless couple had late in life, adopting a son with no 
familial connection would have been a viable option. This is tlie situation of the opposition in 
Isaeus 4.
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which likewise depended on the mother's sexual exclusivity. Consequently, 
a legitimate heir, or yvfioiog, was one whose right to succeed to an estate was 
uncontested by virtue of his mother's monagamy. Only women who lived in 
an oikos with a citizen man and who shared with him the intent of recreating 
that oikos ("to ouvoÎK8iv")~a woman for whom alternative sexual relationships 
were forbidden—could produce yvfiaioi. These women were yvvaiKeq, wed 
through the process known as éyyuT) and naXXaxai, concubines given in a 
similar but less formal process.^ As Harrison points out, these women's 
chastity was protected—I would say enforced— because they were the necessary 
vehicles for carrying on the oikos
The sexual structure of Athenian society
The Periclean Citizenship Law further complicated matters. After 450 
B.C., only children whose parents were both citizens could claim Athenian 
citizenship. This additional restriction on sexual relationships solidified the 
sexual-procreative hierarchy that characterised social relations in Isaeus' day. 
The top stratum of this hierarchy was held by full citizens with full 
inheritance rights, those born of citizen father and a sexually exclusive citizen 
mother who raised a family together. The next stratum down was also held by 
full citizens, but those who were voOoi, conceived by citizens outside of a "to 
auvoiK8iv" relationship. As the children of adulterous citizens, they possessed 
only partial inheritance rights, "the bastard's portion". The third stratum was 
the first non-citizen stratum of society: those who were the offspring of an 
alien parent. This included the other category of v60oi, the children of a
E^yy^ Ti, commonly translated as "marriage", was the formal process by which a ybvTi was 
given to her husband by her father (or guardian), and was usually accompanied by the 
exchange of an assessed dowry in the presence of witnesses. Both ywaiKeç and noiXXaKai 
changed residence through the respective procedures, moving from their father's (or 
guardian's) oikos and into the oikos of their avfip. This arrangement was known as ouvoiKeiv, 
"to live in, create, and recreate an oikos with". The reason for giving such a woman as a 
concubine instead of in eyyuii may have been for reasons of poverty, maliciousness, or simply 
to rid an oikos of another undesired mouth to feed. There is no record of a procedure other 
than payment for entering into a sexual relationship with an exatpa or jiopvri, and while there 
was a clear restriction against "to cruvoiKeiv" with an alien éraipa, there was no such 
restriction for one who was a citizen.
Wyse (1904: 289-293) saw the legitimacy of the children as the most important effect 
of a marriage (eyy^ Ti) and claimed that this resulted from the origin of èyyûri as a marriage by 
purchase, including a process of betrothal wliich represented a specific contract carried out 
between suitor and father. "That the validity of a betrothal should determine tlie legitimacy of 
the issue of a marriage ceases to be amazing as soon as we free ourselves from modern 
conceptions of the nature of marriage." (292) Yet origin does not necessarily dictate 
contemporary meaning. There could have been a significant change in conceptual ization 
over the centuries he indicates.
^Harrison (1968) 38
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citizen father and a (foreign) è-raipa or Tcopvrj. The lowest stratum of society 
were the slaves, and unless elevated by their fathers, included the offspring of 
a citizen father and a household slave.
Athens was a sexually structured society: the socio-political status of a 
male citizen's sexual partner determined his offspring's capabilities to vote 
and inherit. Seen another way, women in Athens were valued according to 
the ability of their offspring to inherit a citizen estate, and the greater that 
ability, the lesser their sexual liberty. Because only they could provide 
legitimate children, citizen women became the recognized child-bearers in 
Athens. Thus, daughters were given away when they had reached an age 
suitable "to aDvoiKeiv" (2.4, 8.8), and a citizen marriage convened without a 
child-producing intent was exceptional and explicitly stated as such (6.24). In 
court, an opponent could be deprecated for not finding a second husband for 
a widowed female relative of child-bearing age (8.36), and it was unfair to 
subject a wife of child-bearing age to a childless marriage (2.8). A citizen 
woman of thirty, it was argued, ought to have been "long ago married" and 
not without children (6.14).
Isaeus's speeches illustrate very clearly the seriousness with which 
Athenians took the maintenance of the sexual hierarchy and its political and 
economic repercussions.: ^  Foreigners found guilty of cohabitating with 
citizens could be sold as slaves, and the Athenians with whom they 
cohabitated fined 1000 drachmae. Moreover, Athenians who gave such 
foreigners away in marriage could suffer a loss of their civic rights and 
rewards were offerred to the prosecutors of such cases.:: |sjot surprisingly, a 
client of Isaeus whose citizenship has been challenged by his opponent 
describes the suit as one "of no trifling importance" (8.43), a public affront 
that would stigmatise him for the rest of his life (8.1,8.44-45).The deliberate 
adoption of an alien, even if it was perpetrated by a poor and childless couple 
with no other means of gaining material support, was a "wicked action" 
(12.3). After 346/345 B.C., each deme in Athens underwent periodic revisions 
of its rolls to ensure that non-citizens did not occupy places on them: the case 
presented in speech 12 was made in defense of a citizen so eliminated. Such
:^Thus, the duality of childbirth within tlie Athenian citizenry. If legitimate, tlie child brought 
order and security; if illegitimate, disorder and confusion. The value of a child and its 
contribution to tlie oikos and poUs depended directly on the circumstances in wliich it was 
conceived.
::See Dem. 59 and Osbourne (1985) 44. It is important to note that we have no knowledge of 
how frequently such cases were tried, as Dem. 59 is our only evidence. The severity of the 
punishments, however, amply testifies to the gravity of the offences.
:^Such an action was serious and insulting enough to warrant use of the verb ùppiÇo).
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an elimination deprived him one of the only "proofs" of citizenship that 
existed, jeopardizing both his citizenship and inheritance rights.
Additional regulations further illustrate the gravity of the issue. 
Anyone who interfered with the automatic devolution of an estate to an 
epikleros was subject to punishment and a summons to the archon's court (3.46-
48). Draco's homicide law^  ^permitted the killing of a man if he were caught in 
flagrante delicto with the eyyuTiTT) yvvr\, naXXaKr\, or 0uydTT(p of another 
Athenian citizen. If discovered otherwise or saved from such an extreme 
penalty, he would be subject to whatever physical or financial punishment the 
husband deemed appropriate, short of using a knife. The severity of this law 
and the prescription that an adulterous citizen woman caught in such an act 
was compelled to leave her husband, vulnerable to condoned public 
humiliation, and prevented from participating in religious rituals:^ 
underscores the mutual responsibility for the offence, a legal anomaly in 
Athens.:^ The rigorous chastisement of the citizen woman involved indicts 
her as a responsible and decisive legal agent; she is not a minor in this matter, 
as she is in other legal matters.:^ She, and other women known to have been 
scandalous in sexual matters, were restricted from participation in the annual 
Thesmophoria, the women-only festival in honor of Demeter and Persephone 
(6.48-49). The revelation in court that an enemy was an adulterer and 
punished as such formed part of Isaeus' defamation of that enemy (8.44); it 
was considered so harmful he concluded the case with the depositions 
substantiating the accusation (8.46). Similarly, the insinuation that a legal 
opponent wasted the resources of his oikos on young boys cast him in a 
negative light as one who neglected the duty of perpetuating a trierarchy- 
supporting household (5.43). The threat to the legitimate perpetuation of an 
oikos was the determining principle in sexual regulation and was utilised as
l^Dem. 23.53.
14Dem. 59.87.
:^As Cohen (1994) 118, 122-132 points out, the content of the legal strictures about adultery 
are deceptively simple answers to the broader question of regulation. He notes the total lack 
of evidence for prosecutions against adulterers, indicates that Isaeus 8.44 and Xen. M entor. 2. 
1. 5 demonstrate that it was not customary to kill adulterers, and shows that there may well 
have been a conflict between the older Draconian law and a newer law of KaKobpyoi covering 
adultery. Ultimately, the conception of adultery that mattered and its proper punishment 
rested in the minds of the jurors. It is an exceedingly complex issue, but the point here is more 
conceptual than procedural: the actual regulation of adultery may have been very different 
than our sources indicate, but the laws themselves show a fundamental preoccupation with 
ensuring the paternity of citizen children.
:^Sealey (1990) 28-29 maintains that these regulations illustrate the "legal passivity of the 
woman": because she was not tried, she was not legally liable. That the law both mandated 
that she leave her husband and allowed the infliction of abuse and social sanction against her 
should leave no doubt as to her position as a responsible legal agent.
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such in court. When there was no risk of a paternity crisis, a sexual 
relationship with a woman—such as with an eraipa, Tcopvn, or slave—was not 
liable to legal penalty.
The problem of proof, forensic disputes and Isaeus 3
One irony of the creation of this sexual hierarchy was that, while a 
citizen's position in it was a serious matter, substantiating that position was 
difficult. There existed no indisputable means of proving one's socio-sexual 
status, or, more precisely, the socio-sexual status of one's mother. There were 
no records of èyyun marriages, citizen or the children produced
from the unions of those relationships. The only relevant record was of 
legitimate sons introduced into the phratries by their fathers and the rolls of 
the demes. Each phratry required its members to swear to the legitimacy of 
their sons when introducing them to the phratry. This oath, that the son was 
àaTHÇ Kai yeyovota Ôp0o5ç (7.16) or àaTqç kuI yuvaiKoç (8.19)
was followed by an inscription into the public register if no members objected 
(7.16-17). One's presence at sacrifices, festivals, and feasts with close relatives 
(8.15-17), the arrangement of wedding feasts and marriage banquets (8. 18- 
19), and the election, by the wives of deme members, of one's mother to 
preside over the Thesmophoria (8.19) were also used as "proofs", as was 
information regarding a mother's burial, her tomb, and the performance of 
customary rites over it (6.64-65). That the strongest of these legitimacy tests, 
the phratry oath, did not prove legitimacy but only confirmed that the phratry 
members believed in the subject's claim to it reveals the complexity and 
ambiguity of substantiating legitimacy under challenge in court.
Consequently, disputes over legitimacy and paternity abounded in 
inheritance-related cases. Speeches 3, 6, 8, and 12 revolve partially or wholly 
around paternity or legitimacy claims and the speaker in 4 asserts that the 
opposition has attempted to distract the jury "by inventing another father for 
the deceased". The central argument of speech 6 is that a ixopvTi exerted a 
powerful enough influence over a citizen man to use him to obtain the rights 
of citizenship and inheritance for her vo0o<; son (6.10-34). Speech 3, On the 
Estate of Pyrrhus, is the most enlightening of Isaeus' cases in regard to the 
sexual ethos of Athens and the problems that that ethos created. It underscores 
how ambiguous and yet how important for inheritance purposes the nature of 
a union between a citizen man and a citizen woman was in the fourth century 
polis. The case rests on the assumption that the èmîpu with whom a male 
citizen had a sexual relationship was a citizen: she was neither an alien, like 
the vast majority of exaipai in Athens, nor a wedded wife, nor a concubine
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kept specifically for raising legitimate children. It is an exceptional case, but 
one that reveals clearly the sexual mores, attitudes, and hierarchies within 
Athenian society and the citizenry itself.
Isaeus 3, On The E state o f Pyrrhus
The contest was one between the deceased's allegedly legitimate 
daughter and his sister. Isaeus argues that Phile, Pyrrhus’ daughter,:^ could 
not legally inherit her father's estate because she was éialpaç and not èÇ 
èy7 \)T|Tfiç. The mother of Isaeus' client had laid claim to an estate originally 
belonging to her brother, Pyrrhus. Pyrrhus had adopted his sister's son, 
Endius, and, after Pyrrhus' death, Endius had enjoyed the estate for twenty 
years. He had no sons of his own, and being an adopted son, the estate 
necessarily reverted back to his adoptive father's oikos upon his own death, 
opening it to claims. The speaker's mother claimed the inheritance as next of 
kin, but had been challenged by Phile.
Phile had previously claimed to be the daughter of Pyrrhus via an 
eyyuri union with Nicodemus' sister. Pyrrhus and Nicodemus' sister had 
clearly enjoyed a relationship of some duration, and both sides were in 
agreement that they raised the child and made suitable provisions for her 
protection. But Phile was not the child of an èyyÙT| marriage; this had been 
proven in an earlier perjury case (3.5-6), brought against Phile's husband, 
Xenocles, who had testified to the validity of the Èyy6T|. Nicodemus had also 
testified to the validity of the èyyvt] between his sister and Pyrrhus, and the 
present case was brought to convict him of perjury in a similar manner. Using 
the same evidence that had been used successfully against Xenocles, the 
speaker sought either further to substantiate his mother's claim or publicly to 
humiliate Nicodemus, who would now have been considered a personal 
enemy. Technically a perjury case, its main focus is the right to claim the 
estate. The speech rather confusingly indicates that Phile had given up her 
claim to the estate (3.6) and that her husband wished to continue with the 
claim (3.56).
:^The speaker does not contest Phile's status as a citizen; there are no challenges to the 
citizenship either of Pyrrhus, her father, to Nicodemus, her maternal uncle, or her mother, 
and she herself was married, with her K'ûpioç' apparent knowledge, by èyybn  (3.45, 49, 70). 
Any such challenge to her citizenship would have represented a far stronger claim. By virtue 
of non-citizenship, Phile would automatically have been ineligible to inherit the estate. We 
would have to assume that the speaker would have argued that if he had the option. The 
issue, as Isaeus presents it, is whether a citizen whose mother was (or was perceived to be) 
an èxaîpa could inherit her father's estate.
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This case and the case that preceded it rested on proving "whether the 
woman challenging the possession of my uncle’s estate was the offspring of a 
wedded wife (é  ^ èyy'üTiT'nç) or an hetaira (è  ^èTaipaç)" (3.6). Isaeus clearly 
states the significance of this point: "Perhaps it will be urged that it was a 
trifling matter of secondary importance....How so when the trial for perjury, 
in which Xenocles was defendant, turned upon this very point, as to whether 
his own wife was èTalpaç or èyyuTiTng ?"(3.24). Isaeus shies away from a 
direct statement that the previous case proved that, not being a child of a yuvfi 
èyyufiTTi , Phile could not inherit, but his emphasis on the contention of 
marriage by éyyufi (3.4, 6, 8-13, 24, 77), his repeated statements that that 
contention was disproved by perjury in the previous trial of Xenocles (3.4-7), 
and his note that Phile had since dropped her claim to the estate (3.6) leave 
the point in no doubt. If Phile had been able to prove her claim to be the child 
of a woman in an eyyuri union, she would have been established as the 
rightful heir to the estate (3.5): .^ She chose the éyy'UTj claim and she lost; her 
claim was now lost (3.6): .^
Isaeus seeks to demonstrate that the éyyuri could not have happened 
because of the lack of credible witnesses and an assessed dowry (3.18-39). 
There never could have been an èyyuTi between Pyrrhus and Phile's mother, 
Isaeus argues, because of the lack of a dowry and the limited number of 
witnesses (3.18-39). Isaeus insists that an Gyyuq marriage to a man of Pyrrhus' 
wealth would have to be accompanied by a dowry and a multitude of 
witnesses (8,18); if these were not present, the èyy'6'n simply did not happen. 
Because an exalpa did not need witnesses or a dowry when she entered into a 
relationship with a citizen man, and she was distinct from both eyyuiyrai and 
TiaXlaicai (3.39). The latter, even though of a lower status than èyyu'nxai, were 
still provided with provisions for maintenance. Phile's mother could in no 
way have enjoyed a "to auvotKeiv" relationship with Pyrrhus; this living 
arrangement always included financial stipulations to solidify the bond 
between a man and woman and to prevent the woman from being thrown out 
of the oikos (3.29, 36). An exatpa could be easily cast off, for there was no 
dowry to keep a man faithful and committed to her.
Two arguments allegedly support these contentions, one procedural, 
one conjectural. Isaeus argues that previous protestations could have been
:^"[Nicodemus] dared to give witness tliat he gave his sister to to our uncle in éyytni to be his 
yuvaiKd Kaxa xoùç v0|xoug....For if the present defendant [Nicodemus] had not been recognized
as having given false witness the woman who was testified to be the yvfiaia Buyaxnp of my
uncle would have been established as K^ tipovopcç, and not our mother." (3.4-5)
D' But since the witness was convicted and the woman who claimed to be the yviiaia Ouydxnp 
of Pyrrhus abandoned her claim to the estate" (3.6).
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made in favour of Phile as the rightful successor to her father's estate (3.40-53) 
and that Xenocles and Pyrrhus, by their very actions, did not consider Phile to 
be èYY'ufjTri (3.54-77). The protestation filed by Phile to claim the inheritance 
upon the death of Endius must have been contrived because at two earlier 
occasions, the succession of Endius to the estate and the marriage of Phile to 
Xenocles, the provisions pursuant to Phile's stature as an inheritable daughter 
were not established. If Phile's mother were Pyrrhus' èYY'U'nxTi, Isaeus argues, 
Phile would have had the estate as epikleros upon the death of Pyrrhus; it 
would have devolved naturally to her (3.40-48). No proceedings were brought 
denouncing Endius as abusing the rights of an epikleros (3.46-48), and he could 
not have been so foolish or negligent not to marry her himself had she been 
legitimate (3.50-51). The dowry given by Endius when he gave Phile in èYY'ufi 
to Xenocles was too low to be considered that of a legitimate child (3.49,51). 
Neither Xenocles nor Pyrrhus nor Endius' uncles, all of whom acted as kurios 
for Phile, recognised her as being born from an èyYWi marriage (3.57-77).
Isaeus strives to create as negative an impression of Phile's mother as 
possible. The main force of his opening argument is to underscore that Phile's 
mother was Korvfi, common, and available to all who wanted her for a sexual 
relationship.20 He states this five times in the course of six sections (3.11-16) 
and in his final summary (3.77), and intersperses his claims about her sexual 
availability with assertions that Phile was born of irregular birth (12)21, her 
mother's lovers could not be easily enumerated (3.11), and she had never 
engaged in any type of eyyuTi or "to ao)voiK8iv" relationship (3.16). He 
addresses her as xoiauxTiç "such a woman" or "this type of woman" 
repeatedly (3.16,28-29). A woman such as Phile's mother, Isaeus argues, could 
not, by her very commonness, be "Yet when once they have
admitted that the woman was at the disposal of anyone who wished to take 
her, how can it reasonably be conceived that she was also a wedded wife?"
(3.11). Furthermore, her social behaviour reinforced this: the cause of
20Although Sealey (1990) 31 notes that the issue is not strictly the sexual status of Phile's 
mother, but the question of paternity, he neglects the central link between these. He contends 
that "the law of inheritance and citizenship inquired only into the identity of the actual 
parents and their status as citizens; the nature of the union between the parents...was a matter 
of indifference to the law" (32-33). That Phile could be given in and raise children who 
themselves could legally inherit supports this point, but there is an additional and equally 
important one to be considered: could Phile herself lega lly  inherit? According to the speaker 
of Isaeus 3, she could not, and this was determined by her mother’s sexual liberty. The law of 
inheritance did inquire into the nature of the union between the parents, because the nature of 
the union was itself dependent on the sexual exclusivity of the mother.
2: Isaeus argues that the jury of the preceding case had judged that the estate could not 
devolve to a |xn ôpSrôç YGYeviipév%i yuvaiKl.
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frequent quarrels, serenades, and scenes, she accompanied Pyrrhus to dinners 
and feasted in the company of strangers (3.13-14).
According to Isaeus' representation, there was a division within the 
citizen class, the àaxfiç community at the top of Athenian society: it 
consisted of those èyyuTixfiç and those éxaipaç, and that division, based 
on the presence or absence of eyyuri, determined inheritance rights. Isaeus' 
entire case rests on the supposition that there was a wide gulf between an 
eyyufixT) and an éxaîpa in every regard, and that the inheritability of a child 
from one of these two women was validated or invalidated as a result. Phile's 
mother's sexual activity was the origin of her invalidation: Isaeus' explicit 
preoccupation with it in the beginning of the speech and his implicit concern 
with it throughout the speech reveals the link between paternity, sexual 
exclusivity, and inheritance that dictated Athenian citizen succession rights. 
Isaeus himself acknowledged that proof of eyyvi] would have entitled Phile to 
rightful succession to the estate (3.5). A sexually exclusive relationship was 
either eyy'DTi or "to cwoixeiv" (3.16), one in which both the man and the 
woman involved lived in the same household, which they could pass on to 
children who resulted from their sexual union, who were "properly born"
(3.12).
Critiquing Isaeus 3
There are several points to consider before drawing conclusions from 
Isaeus' representation of sexual relations in his third speech. On The Estate of 
Pyrrhus is a case built almost entirely on probabilities, and Isaeus himself 
admits the role of them in his argument (3.18)22. It is littered with rhetorical 
questions about the plausibility of actions (3.48, 50, 51, 11, 31-32, 37, 39, 43), 
irrelevant or undisputed laws and arguments (the provision of a dowry: 3.28- 
40; the epikleros law: 3.64), hypothetical circumstances (Xenocles: 3.56-62; 
Pyrrhus: 3.72-77), insinuation, the repetition of laws and arguments (3.42, 64, 
68; 44-53) and a general verbosity that betrays a long-winded argument of 
little substance. There is a notable lack of supportive legal stricture for Isaeus' 
arguments. Nowhere does Isaeus cite a law claiming that eyyur) was the only 
legally valid relationship for claiming succession rights, nor does he cite a law 
stating that a union of a citizen man and a citizen èxaîpa would not result in 
children who could inherit an estate. He fails to mention any law mandating 
the presence of dowries in eyyuri marriages; numerous references from 
Athenian forensic oratory demonstrate that èyyuri marriages often did not
22%66ev o6v av xiç 0a<î)é0tepov xo Tipâyiia 0Ke\|/diJ,evoç
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include them.23 Throughout the speech Isaeus states that Phile was given in 
éYYUTi to Xenocles "as if she were the child of an émipa" (3.45, 48, 52, 55, 70) 
but makes no legal reference to what that means. Finally, the arguments 
Isaeus makes based on the lack of previous protestations and the actions of 
Xenocles and Pyrrhus are almost wholly reliant on the substantiations made 
in the earlier arguments on eYTun and the dowry; they do not stand on their 
own.
Isaeus also conveniently ignores important considerations. It is clear 
that 8YY'üT| is a major issue in the case, and would have greatly benefitted Phile 
had she been able to prove it. Yet, it was not the only legitimate form of sexual 
union in Athens: citizen jcallaxal lived with citizen men in their homes and 
bore them legitimate children. Isaeus himself recognizes this in 3.16 and 
3.39,24 but his entire argument is one that depends on seeing Phile's mother as 
either èYY'^ fl'm or éTaîpa. Isaeus abstracts the sexual scenario, choosing the two 
ends of a continuum of possibilities appropriate for a female citizen.25 Was 
Phile's mother a Did Isaeus frame her as an ètaîpa because the
behaviours that characterised one were less appealing to a jury in an 
inheritance case? The questions are worth asking. And while we could argue 
that Isaeus had the liberty to do this exactly because Phile had at first claimed 
that her mother was married by èYY'^ 'n when she was not, the point remains 
that Isaeus attempted to transform an argument based on relative merit into 
one based on absolute or singular merit.
On The Estate of Pyrrhus is not at all a case that utilises what we would 
consider to be legal evidence. We must acknowledge that our notions of what
2^Lys. 19.14-17 presents accepting a wife without a dowry as an honorable act of charity. 
Wyse (1904) 295 notes that the "plea of poverty" is a simple answer to this argument. He 
states (275) in his characteristically derisive manner: "The arguments based on the absence of 
a marriage portion are so patently ineffective that the stress laid on the point is not a little 
puzzling". But it would be wrong to think that this argument, whetlier law-based or not, was 
necessarily puzzling to an Athenian jury.
243.16 is clearest: "this woman....was common to all who wished to associate with her, and 
...obviously was never married to or lived with the intention of recreating an oikos (éYywiOelora 
oùôè ouvoïKîiaaaa) with anyone else." This passage demonstrates that eyyvn and' to ouvoiKeiv" 
are not entirely synonomous: there existed another form of "legitimate" relationship, which 
must be that with a jtaXX,aicn. Inexplicably, thispassage has been ignored in recent discussions 
of "legitimate" sexual relationships.
25 The number of citizen èralpai in Athens must have been small. While Antiphanes ap. 
Athen. 13.29, 572a states that Athenian women sometimes became éxaipai, it is difficult to 
imagine that such a group would even exist after the institution of the Fericlean Citizenship 
Law and the Thesmophoria restrictions. Not all citizen woman would necessarily have 
entered into a sexual relationship with a citizen man to bear children, but it seems doubtful 
that there could have been many citizen women who chose the lifestyle of an èxaîpa and 
made a living for themselves as such. Isaeus may have deliberately cast her as a unique 
citizen woman—one who acted as the foreign èxaîpa did—to cultivate a negative reaction 
against her.
46
we believe constitutes credibility and what the Athenians believed constituted 
credibility could be two very different things. We make a significant error if 
we approach an analysis of this case supposing that the Athenian jury valued 
those same things we value, that its task was the same, or even that the task of 
the judicial system was the s a m e .2 6  That Isaeus made such arguments, 
however fallacious or unconvincing they seem to us, is enough to make us 
consider the issue seriously.
Furthermore, in knowing his male jury and what would appeal to 
them, Isaeus could well have known their desires for a reality that did not 
exist, but which could be partially realised in the court room. An issue as 
laden with gender-specific connotations and biases as sexuality could be 
grossly exploited in an arena where the judges and speakers were all of one 
sex. At best, the sexual "norms" that we are getting are compromised. If 
Isaeus appealed to the jury using perceived social norms, behaviours or actions 
that male Athenians thought were normative but were not, in fact, or desired 
social norms, behaviours or actions that they knew were not normative but 
wanted to be, the image we receive becomes even more distorted. The 
judges of Isaeus 3 could have utilised their verdicts to realise their desire for a 
particular image of gender relations and expectations, mandating a reality for 
others that did not exist for themselves in the only opportunity they would 
have had to condone and implement such an image without the possibility of 
a female c h a l l e n g e . 22 There could well have been a dual reality of 
sexual/gender relations, one mandated by and manifested in court, the other, 
mandated by and manifested in everyday, non-forensic experience. Our 
search for quotidian reality, however we define that, is frustrated by the fact 
that we possess a relative abundance of the former, less representative 
evidence and a relative lack of the latter, more representative evidence.
26And even "we" is Itself ambiguous in the legal context: the United States, Scotland, and 
England have significantly different legal systems and procedures. A caution to the kind of 
error to which we can easily fall prey is best provided by Wyse. His comments on the "noise 
and bluster" (294), "artful dilemnas" (276), "utterly worthless" arguments (320) and 
"disagreeable impression of trickiness and dishonesty" (276) in this speech betray a belief in 
some ability to, having transcended the barriers of space and time, have participated in a 
fourth century Athenian jury.
22Bourdieu’s (1977) 37, 196 comments on informers apply here as well: the lack of possible 
challenge in any such situation is cause for concern as to the validity of what is stated as 
reflecting a true social norm. Neither a Kabyle informant nor an Athenian juror would have 
been faced with the prospect of having to defend or support his statement or decision to those 
who would most likely challenge it. The possibility of such a challenge is a telling test for 
ensuring, to the highest degree possible, that tlie truth is being divulged. Athenian women 
were, however, clearly interested in the decisions their male relatives made, and made 
detailed inquisitions about them: see Dem. 59.110-112 on justifying a verdict to female 
relatives.
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A masterful Isaeus would have knowingly catered to this dual reality. 
Views of sexuality and gender relations in Athens were not strictly delineated 
along male-female lines, but the fact that there are two human sexes means 
that it is an issue to be considered. We cannot measure these possible sex- 
based delineations, but we can question, as informed critics, the image of 
sexuality and gender relations we have received. Is this image a forensic 
facade or a more substantial social reality?
Conclusions From Isaeus 3
We can draw five main conclusions from Isaeus 3. First, the perception 
of a women's sexual relationship is what mattered in court. The lack of a 
specific legal definition of marriage, distinct definitions of Yhaioq and vôBoç, 
and state records of marriage meant that accusations and anecdotal evidence 
about behaviour and social contact were influential in persuading a jury that a 
specific sexual relationship did or did not exist. At its most basic level, 
succession was a sexual affair. Substantiating citizenship and legitimacy 
meant validating one's place, and one's mother's place, in the sexual 
hierarchy that defined Classical Athens. Where two or more citizen parties 
made a claim to the same estate, the nature of the sexual unions between 
family and non-family members—or, rather, the perception of those sexual 
unions—could be significant factors in determining succession.
Consequently, there existed four separate sub-classes within the citizen 
class, based on the nature of the sexual unions available to them. This is the 
second point. The first two sub-classes form the "to auvoiKeiv" group: the 
children of a citizen man and citizen woman married by èyY'^ B (who had full 
inheritance rights) and the children of a citizen man and citizen 7taXXaKf| 
(whose inheritance rights were more ambiguous, but most likely equal to or 
close to those of the first group). The last two form the non-"to ouvoiKeiv" 
group: those who were the children of adulterous citizens (who could receive 
a "bastard’s portion" inheritance) and the children of a citizen man and citizen 
exaipa, of which Isaeus argues Phile is one. Only the top sub-class, the 
children of a citizen man and citizen woman perceived to have been married 
by eYYi^ h, held an irrefutable claim to an estate as legitimate children.
The third point is that these divisions, and the others within the sexual 
hierarchy of Athens, were not rigid and inflexible: the ambiguity of 
definitions and proofs and the value placed on perceptions in Athenian law 
made possible a great deal of fluidity between and manipulation of these 
divisions. Isaeus rests much of his case in On The Estate of Pyrrhus on 
traditional alien characteristics of an éxaipa, yet the woman at the centre of the
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argument is a citizen, and the traditional characteristics utilised in the 
argument bear precisely upon the sexual norms associated with citizenship 
and succession. The exaipa or, more accurately, the behaviours associated 
with one, was a cross-class phenomenon, and would be everywhere 
disadvantaged. The sexual mores of an èxaîpa or one perceived to have acted 
like one invalidated her offspring as inheritors, even though those offspring 
may have been able to vote and participate in the politics of the polis.
That such a disinherited offspring could herself have children that 
inherited accentuates the complexity and contradiction inherent in Athenian 
inheritance law and the core of social values it represented, our fourth point. 
A woman such as Phile could pass on to her children rights she herself did 
not possess: since her children were citizens, they could create their own 
citizen oikos and pass on the inheritance of that oikos to their own offspring. A 
citizen èxaîpa's grandchild was enabled in a way that her child was not. Yet, 
for the family of an alien èxaîpa, the question was moot: without citizenship, 
neither the child nor grandchild could inherit an oikos, much less pass one on. 
The rights of v60oi were structured similarly. The children of adulterous 
citizens enjoyed all the rights of citizenship but were denied full inheritance, 
yet could create and pass on their own oikoi, which their children could 
inherit. The offspring of a citizen and alien, however, were denied all political 
and succession rights, as would be all of their descendants. In Athens, there 
existed a complex and deceptive matrix of citizenship rights, succession 
rights, and succession rights held in abeyance.
Finally, although Isaeus 3 provides an insight into the principles that 
governed Athenian inheritance law, it would be misguided to assume that 
these principles necessitated a certain legal consistency. Consistency was not, as 
far as we can tell, a feature or concern of the Athenian legal system; the classes 
and sub-classes made possible by the legal regulation of citizenship and 
succession through sexual relations made manipulation of the law and the 
hierarchies it created not only feasible but an encouraged, even integral, 
aspect of winning a case. The greater the regulation, the more to exploit. The 
courtroom became a political arena, a ground for exercising interpersonal, 
interfamilial, or intrafamilial conflict and accomplishing retribution or 
vengeance, stripping an enemy of treasured possessions by stripping him or 
his loved ones of their sexual privacy. The sexuality of Athenian citizen 
women was a weapon to be used and abused in court.
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Citizenship, Succession, and Sexuality in Athens
The regulation of citizen sexuality in Athens had two strong political 
dimensions, both of which created the ethos of honour that was integral to 
citizen life. The law regulated sexuality when it created unanswerable 
paternity questions, and the honour of both male and female citizens was 
dependent on ensuring the sanctity of the oikos as a civic institution defined 
by the paternity and inheritability of the children within it. The law also 
regulated sexuality where it infringed upon the personal autonomy of male 
citizens. Citizen male prostitutes, along with the persons responsible for 
hiring them and hiring them out, were forbidden under the threat of dxiiuia, a 
partial or total loss of civic rights.28 Such a man was literally "without honour" 
or "without civic and social prestige" because he placed himself at the mercy 
of his client, surrenduring his personal autonomy. He could no longer lay 
claim to the freedom and privilege of full citizenship if forced into sexual 
submission. The conventions and laws dictating a citizen adult male's pursuit 
of a citizen youth reveal a similar fear of bodily penetration: to give in to 
advances without resistance, and to submit to anal intercourse specifically, 
garnered social sanction.29 Submission was beneath the role of a respectable 
citizen and resistance to it was a cornerstone of personal and political honor. 
The law regulated those situations in which it could take place.
The possibility of the penetration of a citizen male or citizen female in a 
sexual relationship dictated its legality: the socio-political and procreative 
status of those involved determined the validity of the relationship. The threat 
was not sexual intercourse itself but what it could do to the social order.^  ^
Consequently, a "penetration principle", originating in the concern with 
inheritance and sucesson, and manifested in the direct conflict between sexual 
protection and the desire for sexual gratification, governed citizen sexuality in 
Athens. A citizen male had to ensure his own physical well-being and the 
physical well-being of his oikos , which, at its most fundamental level, was the 
sum of the bodies of citizen women living within it.^  ^ This element of
28Aesch. 1.13-14,18-19,195; Andoc. 1.100.
29See Dover (1978) 81-84,91-100,103.
^^Harrison (1968) 38: "it was not the [sexual] acts themselves, but the involvement of two 
citizens that made them sufficiently abhorrent to entail legal punishment."
^^ Or, possibly, the sum of all bodies within it, male and female. An attractive youth was at the 
risk of anal penetration when courted by an erastes while still under the kureia of his father. 
Had such an act have taken place, his father failed in his duty to protect the lad, as he would 
have failed to protect his daughter had she been caught in a similar situation. The 
conventional disparagement of intercourse through the emphasis placed on resisting the 
advances of a male erastes, the legal strictures restricting the time and place for such contact, 
and the case of Timarchus (Aesch. 1) suggest that this broader conclusion has merit. (See 
Dover (1978) 81-103.)
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protection was the first test for being a man of honour: to possess a male 
citizen must have come from and ensure an impenetrable oikos. But a desire 
for sexual penetration (as the subject) balanced out this fear of it (as the 
object). A secondary, offensive component of xipfi complemented its primary, 
defensive component. The multiplicity of outlets for sexual energy and the 
severe proscription of adultery in Athens testify to male citizens' varied 
pursuit of sexual gratification. Honour came not only from protecting one's 
own wife or concubine, but also from penetrating another's. The conqueror of 
another man's oikos was a man of standing in the polis as well.^2
There was a second conflict present in Athenian sexual regulation, that 
between vopcç and (|)i5aiç. The legal system of Athens was a means of 
controlling the undeniable procreative and seductive bases of female sexual 
power. Athenian law and custom sought to put the male citizen in sexual 
control. At the least, it attempted to give him control of the consequences of 
his sexual relationships. The double standards of Athenian sexual regulation 
reveal the artificiality of the system necessary to do this, and the legal battles, 
in their revelation of the vulnerability of this system to contravention and 
manipulation, reveal its ultimate failure.
The sexual structuring of Athenian society originated partially in the 
inheritance concerns at the heart of Isaeus's speeches. Privilege in Athens, in 
its highest legal and political terms, was dependent on sexual restriction, 
which was in turn dominated by a preoccupation with bodily penetration, 
and more specifically, the threat that such penetration represented to 
patrimony. The perception of the sexual behaviour of female Athenian 
citizens was an essential aspect of this sexual restriction and the privilege it
A conclusion following the narrower definition of an oikos would be that the fear of 
penetration in toto originated in the specific tlireat to inheritance it represented in sexual 
relationship with a woman: i.e., the conceptual condemnation of penetration, applicable to all 
relationships, originated in the threat to inheritance that penetration of the oikos and the 
women within it represented. The threat of penetration in relationships where paternity was 
at issue affected those where it was not.
Whether penetration was seen as unfavorable first in procreative relationships and 
later translated to all sexual relationships or was unfavorable "to begin with", the point 
remains: being the object of penetration was deemed unsuitable for the possession of full xijLifi 
and the political participation it entailed.
32lf proven or insinuated in court, as in 8.44,46, such a conquest became a liability. Thus, this 
secondary component of honour was contextual: in the neighborhood or among friends, an 
adulterous conquest was a source of pride, while in the public, law-oriented setting of court, 
it was a source of sanction.
There were many, if not myriad, ways to manipulate one's image, and thus, one’s 
xiiiiî. Cohen (1994) 81, 92-96 emphasises the strategic nature of Ttgii in a culture where "it is 
more important to be thought honorable by the community than to be honorable before one's 
conscience". Note Bourdieu's (1977) 161 comment on the furtiveness and suspicion of tlie 
movements of women at mid-day, when tlieir menfolk rested at work.
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determined. The economic manifestations of sexual regulation found in 
Isaeus were a building block of the Athenian democracy.
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Chapter Four 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS I
The previous chapter has illustrated the sexual dimensions of the 
Athenian family; we will now investigate its legal and economic dimensions. 
Integral to our investigation will be an examination of aspects of the family's 
security and the institutions upon which that security depended: the kurios, 
epitropos, and adopted son. The legal and economic relations in Isaeus's speeches 
reveal the strengths and the weaknesses of family structure in Athens, the 
principles which dictated that structure, and those that dictated state 
intervention. 1 We will see how the custom and law that Isaeus utilised both 
created smooth channels through which estates and assets could flow and made 
possible the eclipse of the family ethic by personal greed.
Legal and economic relations in Classical Athens differed substantially 
based upon the sex of the agents involved. Consequently, we must investigate 
legal and economic relations in which men and women were involved separately 
from those in which only men were involved. This chapter will begin with a look 
at the evidence for women's direct and indirect influence in inheritance cases, 
continue with representations of women as independent economic agents, and 
proceed with a more detailed examination of their legal and economic relations 
with members of the anchisteia. The next chapter will examine representations of 
men in economic and legal relationships with other male family members, and its 
conclusion will bridge the two chapters, drawing out the similarities and 
accentuating the differences between those interactions and the ones addressed 
in this chapter.
Women as Legal/Economic Agents
Court cases in Isaeus, as in all of the Attic Orators, are overwhelmingly 
male affairs. The lack of significant women in Isaeus's speeches and the 
necessarily mediated form in which the few significant women in his speeches 
act restrains our ability to dig as deeply into gender relations as we might like. 
There are, however, some important pieces of evidence to consider. A citizen
 ^ Lacey (1968) addresses some of these issues in chapters five and six of his classic book but only 
partially, or in passing. His work is an excellent survey of the evidence regarding women, the 
family, and the state, but it fails to present any coherent and articulate conclusions about the 
structure, continuity, and security of the Athenian family.
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woman is a primary adversary in speeches 7 and 11, while in 3, both the claimant 
and the defendant are women. Women are mentioned in four other speeches (5, 
6,10,12) in a legal or economic capacity, but only in speech 10 is the reference to 
the woman essential to the argument of the case; the other references are made 
primarily as background or secondary information. We will begin with a look at 
representations of women as influential legal and forensic agents and then 
progress to a more specific focus on the economic capabilities of the speaker's 
mother in speech 10. We will conclude with an examination of their position as 
epikleroi and minors.
How does Isaeus represent women as acting in a forensic or legal 
capacity? The language of speeches 3, 5, 7, and 11 clearly puts the initiative for 
pursuing legal action with the citizen women whose rights allegedly were being 
violated. In 3.2-6, it is Phile herself who is represented as coming forward to 
claim the estate; as f\ ellT|%uia xoû yx>vr\ (3.3) and fi à|i(j)icpTixo'Oaa xoû
kX,tipo\) (3.6), she instigated and pursued the case of her own accord. She made 
the decisions related to the claim, including the decision to abandon it (3.6).2 
Phile occupies the active role in the account of the history of the dispute with 
which these opening sections are concerned. Similarly, the wife of Pronapes is 
d|Li(()iap'nxo'uaa (7.43), and the speaker in speech 7 states that a claim was not 
available to her specifically (xaux-q pèv ouv oùSè pépouç TcpoonKe: 7.20).
This phrase is echoed in 5.6 in reference to the wife of Protarchides. She is one of 
the two women to whom Dicaeogenes forfeited two-thirds of the estate in the 
following sentence (5.27).
Each of these women is necessarily represented in court by her husband. 
Phile's husband "demanded to be given possession of the estate" (3.2), and was 
responsible for claiming his wife's patrimony (3.55,30). The speaker suggests in 
5.27 that Protarchides himself receive the share of the estate in question on behalf 
of his wife. Similarly, Pronapes claimed on behalf of his wife (7.2,43). But these 
representations are themselves qualified: Phile's husband is mentioned as her 
kurios specifically in 3.3, but only xfjç elA.îix'üiaç xoû xliipou yuvaiKoq "of the 
woman who was suing for the estate", and Pronapes claimed "on behalf of the 
woman claiming" (ÙTcèp xfiç àg<t)iapTixo'ücrTiç- 7.43). He bears the blame for actions 
previously directed at his wife in the closing arguments, of which she herself is 
the focus (7.45).
2In 3.6 Phile is said to have abandoned her case after the initial perjury case against one of her 
witnesses, yet the case was clearly continued.
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Phile and the wife of Protarchides were legal decision-makers who 
utilised their husbands to act where they themselves could not act. The case of 
the wife of Pronapes is ambiguous, but it is clear that the claims of these cases 
were mutual endeavours that relied on a partnership of husband and wife 
working together to achieve justice (or, at least, victory). The definition of kurios 
as we see it in the first passages of 3, and as it likely would have been applied in 
5 and 7 and in similar cases where a husband and wife act together in making a 
claim, has the sole meaning of "legal representative", or "forensic stand-in".
Speech 11 paints a similar picture for an adult woman represented in a 
claim by a male representative who is (most likely) not her husband. Phylomache 
II, Euboulides' daughter, successfully challenged a will (11.9) and held 
possession of the estate (11.9, 17-18). The mother of Hagnias is represented as 
having a similar right to claiming and possessing the estate. Justice and the laws 
gave her a specific right to it (11.30) in a hypothetical situation described by the 
speaker. When the speaker of the case lodged his claim to her estate, it was "those 
acting on behalf of the daughter of Euboulides" and "the kurioi of Hagnias' 
mother" who protested. The next sentence mentions "those acting on behalf of 
Hagnias' mother" in the same manner.
Both Phylomache II and the mother of Hagnias were represented by 
Isaeus as capable of legal action. That Phylomache II was in clear possession of 
the estate, that she and the mother of Hagnias could make a legal agreement 
between themselves, and that they were represented as potentially either fi éxépa 
viK^, "the one who won" or xfj fixxriBetaTi, "the one who was defeated" (11.21), 
indicates that their kurioi were strictly legal representatives. It was "these women" 
specifically whom the speaker defeated (11.19) when he won the previous case 
that entitled him to possession of the estate. In Isaeus, adult citizen women are 
represented as having directed cases in which they were the main figures. They 
are represented by men in the pursuit of those cases in court, but their claims 
were mutual actions, undertaken in cooperation with their male representatives.
This public legal initiative of the forensic arena is complemented by a 
private legal influence in the domestic sphere. In speech 11, the sister of 
Macartatus persuaded her husband to allow one of their sons to be adopted into 
her brother's oikos (11.49), and in speech 12, the speaker argues that his half- 
sisters had enough influence over their husbands to prevent them from giving 
false evidence in court (12.5). The speaker in speech 10 states that his mother 
insisted that her husband raise the issue of claiming her property in court (10.19).
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The final decision to break a childless marriage and give the wife an opportunity 
to bear children with another husband was the wife's in 2.7-9: while her husband 
and her brothers were early disposed to the idea, they only agreed after she had 
given her very reluctant consent. Apollodorus requested permission from his 
stepsister to adopt one of her sons in 7.14. The opposing speaker in the case 
described in speech 2 argued that the influence of Menecles' second wife was 
strong enough to dictate whom he adopted. Because the will revealing the 
adoption was drawn up "under the influence of a woman", he argued, it was 
invalid. The speaker responds to the charge five times (2.1, 19, 20, 25, 38) and 
states that the woman in question had been the main focus of the opposition’s 
case (2.19).
It is difficult to explain precisely why the law considered the influence of a 
woman detrimental to the validity of a will. Two reasonable explanations present 
themselves. The first is a desire to perpetuate the all-male province of the 
preparation and preservation of legal documents. The second is a belief that the 
recreation of oikoi must remain firmly within the control of the male kurios of an 
estate. Womanly influence, especially if made through a conspiracy of related 
females,^ might allow for the financial weakening of a husband's oikos in favour 
of brothers-in-law or nephews, threatening the continuation of the financially 
secure male family line.  ^ That we can find so many examples of female influence 
in legal affairs in Isaeus seems logical in a family-oriented society such as Athens. 
Women, and especially wives, would make their intentions known in matters 
that would affect them and their loved ones.
In the preceding passages, Isaeus has presented us with women who are 
legally and economically capable and assertive. To these we can add several 
others. Dicaeogenes II split his estate between his adopted son and his sisters in 
his will (5.20), Apollodorus willed his estate to his sister and provided for her 
marriage in it (7.9), and Hagnias II left his niece his considerable estate over his 
nearest male relative (11.8). In speech 11, the mother of the ward suing the 
speaker drew up an inventory of wealth in the company of witnesses, apparently 
after her husband had died (11.43). These passages clearly challenge Just's 
assertion, and others like it common in recent work on women and Athenian
^Lysias 1 illustrates how real the fear of a female conspiracy was.
^Proving such an accusation (as the opposition in speech 2 would have attempted to do) must 
have relied almost entirely on circumstantial evidence. This would not, however, have 
necessarily made it less acceptable to an Athenian jury.
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law, that citizen women's "legal status made it impossible for them to be 
influential owners or administrators of property, and even in the domestic 
sphere, their allocated domain, they were scarcely controllers of their own 
destiny".5 Yet, when we examine the evidence in which the legal/economic 
relationship is more developed—those in which the woman is an epikleros or ward 
under the guardianship of an adult male relative—we find that Isaeus' women 
could also be quite vulnerable. The cases argued in speeches 3, 5, and 10 depend 
on the argument that a woman in such a position could be ruthlessly exploited. 
Because it provides some of the clearest and most consistent language of female 
economic power in the entire Greek corpus , depends directly on the reality of 
economic exploitation, and thus acts as an effective transition into examining the 
evidence for legally and economically vulnerable women, we will begin with 
speech 10.
Speech 10: On The Estate o f Aristarchus
Isaeus wrote speech 10 for the grandson of the deceased Aristarchus, who 
argues that his estate had devolved to his mother and had been wrongfully held 
by other members of the family. Aristomenes, the uncle, took supervision of the 
estate following his brother's death and later gave it to his own daughter and her 
husband Cyronides, who had been previously adopted out of the family (10.5). 
Aristomenes is not directly mentioned as epitropos, but is represented as the 
decision-maker regarding the estate and the niece's well-being. He was 6 
èyyuxaxa yévouç, the closest relative to whom "she should have passed by 
marriage, together with her fortune" (10.5) as heiress to the estate following her 
father's death. That she did not, and that he "neglected to make her his own wife 
or to have her married to his son" (10.5) is represented as "abominable 
treatment": Aristomenes neglected his duty to look after his closest female 
relative. Aristomenes and Cyronides are both dead at the time the case is tried 
(10. 7-8), almost thirty-seven years after the marriage of the mother. The speaker 
acts for his mother only indirectly, as it appears that she is now dead (although 
this is not exactly clear),6 and he would stand to inherit the estate if his argument 
was accepted. His argument, however, is framed almost exclusively in terms of
^Just (1989) 98. See also Fox (1985) 227: "women had no legal capacity to inherit property".
6 The language of the speech indicates both tliat he is claiming for her and that he is claiming for 
himself. 10.1,20, 21, and 23 refer to "we" or "ours"; 10.21, 23, and 25 to "I" , "me", and "my", 10. 21 
is strongest: "the estate is mine" (é|xôv aûxôv elvat). That the case was argued so long after the 
marriage of the motlier supports the view that she was no longer alive.
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his mother, and it is this use of language in this speech that makes it so 
interesting and relevant to our investigation.
The speaker's main assertion is that "this estate was not theirs, but my 
mother's patrimony, from the beginning" (10.3). He emphasises the rightful 
devolution of the property to her, as her patrimony, throughout the case.  ^Yet, the 
estate is also hers in a more forceful and direct way. The repeated use of the 
genitive of possession with KA,fipoç and xpi^paxa suggests that she had more 
interest in the estate than just as a portion set aside for her.  ^ The estate was not 
merely her patrimony, as opposed to her opposition's, it was hers. Further 
references to the manner in which she was forcibly separated from or deprived of 
the estate^ underscore the speaker's mother's possession of it, as does the use of 
feminine form of kurios in reference to the mother in 10.23 (xfjç pTixpôç oümig 
Kupiaç).
The estate was "hers" in three linguistic usages of increasing strength, and 
these usages match the language of ownership utilised with the opposing (male) 
side in the speech. This is specifically articulated in 10. 8, in which the mother is 
stated as receiving the estate from her brother Demochares (after he died) in 
precisely the same language as she received it from Aristarchus.^  ^The conclusion 
that a citizen woman, or, more narrowly, an epikleros, could own and possess 
property and occupy the same authority (as kuria) over her property as a citizen 
man seems a convincing one. But we must consider some important points that 
compromise such a conclusion. The extenuating circumstances of the case and 
the nature of the language both mandate that we carefully consider what we 
have read.
First, it is the son who is arguing the case, and his hope of winning the 
verdict is dependent on his representation of the estate as his mother's. It in no 
way benefits him to represent the estate as anyone else's, even if someone else, 
such as his father, did have, or would have had, control over it. Isaeus's intent
2 ÜTiavxa xavxi xfjç ixrixpôç èyévexo (10.5), ©axe xôv KX,f|pov éîei x^  ê|iQ inTixpl yevéoSai (10.7), ô 
p.èv TcX-npog ...xnç èp.iiç n-Tixpôç èyévexo (10.17), xôv xfjç (xiixpôç îtaxp^ov (10.25), and eiç xfjv èp,qv 
|j.Tixépa xoôxov xôv kXtîpov èTnyiyvôpevov (10.26).
^ôç oô xfîç è|xfiç iLiTixpôç oôxoç (ô) KÀiipôg èaxi (10.14), xôv KXfîpGv eivai xfjç [Xîixpôç (10.15), xôv xî\ç 
liTixpôç KX,npov (10.23), éîit xoiç xnç éjxfîç inixpôç %pii|i.aoi (10.5), xà xnç |o,Tixpôç xpiiM-axa (10.11), and elç 
xà xaôxnç xpftfxaxa (10.12).
9èp,riv 5è ixiixépa, èic xôv ïiaxpc^ ov éK|5âXX,eiv (10.24) and ôv xpÔTiov xôv %pTi]xâx(ov àTteoxepiîOr), xoôx ' 
èoxiv (10.6).
^^xoô 5è Tiaxpôç ’ Apioxdpxoo xç ôei AT|po%dpei KaxaA,i7uôvxoç, èxelvco ôè xf) àôe^ôti xfj èaoxob xaôxri, luixpi 5è ép-if.
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was to keep direct and unambiguous the line of devolution from the speaker’s 
maternal grandfather through his mother to him. His father was from outside of 
the family and may have been dead or remarried at the time of trial. The speaker 
was likely soliciting the sympathy of the jury by deliberately acting the part of 
dutiful son, standing up for or guarding the honour and rights of his mother, 
shrouding his self-interest in constant reference to her.
Second, the verb tenses here and in 10.8, 12, and 14 suggest that the 
property was still the mother's or at least, that she had a claim to it as the trial 
was proceeding. She may not have been dead. Yet, even if she were alive, her son 
was well past the age at which he would have taken over the estate. Why would 
it have been "hers"?
Third, it is difficult to explain the presence of the "one medimnus law" in 
10. 10. It states that a woman, like a child, was expressly forbidden from 
contracting for the disposal of (ougpdXA.(û) more than one medimnus of barley, 
about the amount of grain required to feed a family of four for a week. This law 
has often been cited as evidence that an Athenian woman was severely restricted 
in her economic power. The incidental nature of its reference to women in this 
passage and the lack of a reference to it anywhere else in Athenian law cast 
doubt on this kind of application. Much more important is why Isaeus mentions 
it in a case throughout which he explicitly stresses the language of female 
ownership; it should bring our investigation to a complete, if brief, halt to 
consider whether ownership as we conceive of it is really at issue here.
Fourth, the question of a kuria is a difficult one. The speaker links kurios 
with the verb Kpdxeiv in 10.12; it is only the children, he says, who have the right, 
as kurioi, to Kpaxetv xmv xprifraxcov, lay hold of the possessions of the epikleros 
when they had reached two years past puberty. As the strongest expression of 
ownership used in the speech, this passage suggests that kurios has a meaning 
which bears specifically on direct control or "disposal-management". This 
meaning is supported by the use of kurios in 10.2, in which the speaker links it 
with the verb SidxeoOai, to bequeathe or dispose, and in 10.13, in which it is 
linked with the giving away of a daughter. That "the law ordains that a man can 
dispose of those things that are his to whomever he wishes, but it has never 
made anyone kurios of another person's things" (10.2) is reiterated in 10.13: "for 
the law ordains the kurios can give his things to whomever he wishes, if he takes 
the daughter with him". A kurios, and, presumably, a kuria, was one who had the
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ownership of an estate or a possession requisite with disposing of it or giving it 
away.
Yet, whether kurios had a total "disposal-management" meaning is 
questionable. In 10.12, the speaker, in disputing the alleged adoption of 
Cyronides, states that neither Aristarchus nor Aristomenes would have been able 
to become kurios of his mother’s property had either married her, because only 
the sons of an epikleros could become kurioi of her property. Were young men two 
years past puberty in a position to make judgements about the supervision and 
management of property? The mother would surely regulate or inform her 
sixteen year-old's decisions about property from which all of them benefited, 
and their authority as kurioi would be somewhat mediated. This passage also 
makes clear that the mother's property would have had a male kurios under 
"normal" circumstances and that that kurios would have been her husband. It 
appears that she is the exception that underscores the rule. Whether the use of 
kuria in 10.23 was exceptional in Athenian law—it is "so strange" to Wyse that he 
suspects it to be a textual flaw^^— and Isaeus deliberately utilised it as such to 
give emphasis to his argument or not, it could be that the female kureia applied 
only to epikleroi and/or had a different connotation than the masculine form of 
the word. It could be that there existed a double standard of ownership, kuria and 
the genitive of possession simply indicating the property with which the epikleros 
went, following the literal meaning of epikleros. Equally possible is that the 
language used may have been intended and understood to be relative, more 
clearly setting two parties in opposition to each other, and nothing more.
Consequently, it is difficult to tell precisely what the jury was deciding in 
giving its verdict. Lynn Foxhall has argued that ownership was a private, 
domestic matter that would have been decided within each actual family. ^  2 
Attempting to define narrowly individualistic rights and capabilities is 
frustratingly difficult, if not impossible, and her view that the entire issue of 
defining individual ownership is irrelevant seems both appealing and 
appropriate. This perspective dictates that the jury's task was to determine who 
was entitled to the estate and not to determine, or even to consider, who had (or 
should have had) authoritative and personal control over it. But entitlement was 
not always the first issue in inheritance cases. Isaeus shows us how it was within 
the power of guardians to abuse their power to control an estate when
l^Wyse (1904) 668.
12Foxhall (1989) 22-34.
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entitlement was not challenged. (This is fully examined in the following section 
and in the next chapter.) The jury's task in those cases must have been to decide 
specifically who owned and controlled an estate; under these circumstances, it 
was in the public's interest to ensure that this usually private affair was resolved 
publicly.
The kind of abuse of family responsibility that we find in speech 10 was 
outrageous to the Athenians, and that made it, as an accusation, liable to abuse 
itself, especially in a weak case. Speech 10 is a such a case. As Wyse notes, "in this 
speech there is more reason than usual to mistrust Isaeus"^ ,^ and this weakness 
could well have influenced the structure and content of the a r g u m e n t . 4^ Beyond 
"standard" rhetorical considerations—here, generalisations, an emphasis on the 
extraordinary nature of the situation and not on its actual injustice—are three 
important points. First, it is immediately suspect as Isaeus' shortest speech, a 
mere twenty-six sections consisting of only two arguments (that the estate 
devolved to the mother and that the adoption was illegal) and two short counter­
arguments (the indebtedness of the estate and the lack of previous protestations). 
Second, Isaeus' justification for the lack of previous protestations, the 
opposition's strongest argument, is hardly convincing; he argues that it is "unjust 
that anyone should have less than his due rights through inability or neglect to 
assert them" (10.18), but the active asserion of one's rights was a principle that 
governed inheritance in Athens^  ^and was a significant argument of his in speech 
3. Third, the case is built on convincing the jury to override a decision that the 
archon had made. The will which was presented adopting Cyronides's son as the 
son of Aristarchus had been approved by the archon and the speaker was forced 
to acknowledge that this adoption was valid in the opening of the speech (10.2). 
Either the archon heard no protestation to it or overruled the protestation that
4%yse (1904)656.
4^jt is always dangerous to make judgements about the relative strength or weakness of a court 
case in the Attic Orators, but an orator searching for ways to convince his jury may have distorted 
language in a way that, when language is the key concern, will affect our interpretation. Here is 
where Millett's argument (1991) 243 that most "attempts to determine the relative strength or 
weakness of a speaker's case are...only marginally relevant to the understanding of Athenian 
society" falters.
^^Priority was what courts decided, and if one party gave up their right to claim, the next-in-line 
had rights to it. The anchisteia is the prime example of this: it established a hierarchy of possible 
claimants so that if one party did not claim, the next in line was clearly articulated, hi speech 10, 
no claim was made on the previous two occasions when such a claim would have been most 
expected, when the speaker's mother was married off to an outsider and the property was not 
transferred with her and when Aristomenes passed the property on to his daughter and 
Cyronides, who reinstated himself in the family after having been adopted outside of it.
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was made; in either regard, the adopted son Aristarchus II was the legal heir, and 
an attempt to overrule this decision seems legal n o n s e n s e
In the final analysis, there is a fundamental ambiguity of language that is 
impossible to overcome. Isaeus' strong and consistent phrasing was clearly an 
effort to get the jury accustomed to viewing the estate as the mother's, but the 
language used does not necessarily indicate the mother's actual possession and 
right to disposal over the property. Such language might never indicate actual 
possession and right to disposal: Greek, like English, has no litmus test for 
ownership. There is no word that distinguishes absolutely the ability to control 
or dispose. We can speak of the differences between possession and ownership, 
control and disposal, positive ownership and negative o w n e r s h i p , ! ^  but the 
matter still remains unclear. The test of ownership must always be: why is the 
representation given essential to the case being argued? With this in mind, we 
can make three points about Isaeus 10 with confidence. First, there is a 
continuum of ownership language describing a citizen woman's relationship to 
property that is unique; second, that ownership language reflects the language 
used describing citizen men's relationship with property; and third, this case is 
perhaps the best evidence we have for what Foxhall (1996b) calls "the malleable 
and manipulable nature of the kyreia as an institution".^  ^ Outside of specific
^6it is possible that the archon accepted the will only because no protestation was made. This 
could have been the case if Cyronides returned to the family expressly to prevent his father's oikos 
from dying out, neither he nor his father having anticipated the death of his brother when he was 
adopted out of Hie family. The deatii of Demochares, then, would have been the turning point of 
the whole series of events: Cyronides and Aristomenes technically broke the law, but with the 
interest of Aristarchus' oikos in mind. The archon, as overseer of tlie perpetuation of citizen oikoi in 
Athens, may have been keen to accept such a scheme, ignoring an applicable law in favour of 
saving the oikos. This is precisely the kind of scenario Foxhall (1996b) 142-143 sees as a valuation 
of "social preference" over legal right. If this did indeed happen, the tragedy of the case (for 
Cyronides) is that Aristarchus II, Cyronides' son, died without issue, and the estate, reverting to 
the heir Xenaenetus, was now outside of Aristarchus I's oikos. The basic struggle in this situation, 
between the perpetuation of an oikos and narrow financial self-interest, may have been more 
common than we would imagine. But this would almost always depend on conjecture, and may 
be equally misleading in a case where it is stated as such.
It could also be that the son was pursuing a case that his mother had no intention of 
pursuing; she herself may have given Cyronides tlie blessing to go forward with his plan to save 
her father's oikos. Ths would explain the speaker's weak reasoning that the threats of 
Aristomenes, the Corinthian Wars, and the public treasury kept his father from claiming on his 
mother’s behalf (18-21). The law stated that that an adopted son could not bequeath his adoptive 
father's estate, so a second law may have been broken as well.
^^The discussion of what constituted ownership in Athens is long and uninspiring. See Schapps 
(1979) chapters 1,3, and 4, Harrison (1968) 200-204, and Sealey (1990) 45-48.
^^Fo)diall (1996b) 142-150 examines other examples of women as kuriai and manipulators of their 
kurioi.
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observations of usage, we enter the realm of conjecture. Many of our key words— 
epikleros, kurios, kuria, kratein-- may have had several layers of socio-economic 
meaning, varying according to the specific context in which they were used.
Additional Epikleroi and Minors
An adopted son could act in a manner similar to the uncles in speech 10. 
Speech 5, On the Estate of Dicaeogenes, is a surety suit, the fourth formal legal 
action in a long battle to recover the portion of an estate owed to the speaker and 
those he represents. Ten years previous, the courts accepted a will that 
Dicaeogenes III presented (5.8) giving him the shares in the estate belonging to 
the two aunts and two cousins (his adoptive father's sisters, one of their sons, and 
the daughter of a third sister) for whom he was acting as epitropos and kurios 
(5.10). With this new power, the speaker argues, Dicaeogenes III stripped his 
wards of their possessions (5.9), handed some of those possessions over to their 
enemies, appropriated others, and sold their ancestral home while they were still 
minors (5.10). These charges are lent credence by Dicaeogenes Ill's later 
surrender, after two successful perjury charges brought against his witnesses, of 
the estate in an action sanctioned by the court (5.18). Such actions made 
Dicaeogenes III àvxiôiKoç (5.10) to those he was entrusted with looking after: 
"they did not meet with the slightest degree of pity from him on account of their 
relationship, but orphans and unprotected and penniless, they even lacked all the 
necessities of life" (5.10). The plight of the wards is undoubtedly exaggerated 
here, as is the language denoting "robbery" following the acceptance of the will 
by the court (5.9), but this case highlights the potential vulnerability of female 
wards, the legal and economic power of their epitropos, and the disgrace that the 
abuse of such power held in the eyes of an Athenian jury.
In speeches 5 and 10, there has been one man designated to look out after 
the woman or women mentioned; speech 3 suggests that a young woman may 
have had two, three, or even more such guardians, official or unofficial, and that 
these could have served her interests even after she was married. The speaker 
argues that Nicodemus, a maternal uncle, Endius, an adopted brother, and the 
paternal uncles who witnessed the marriage of her mother and father all 
possessed roles as Phile's guardian. It was Nicodemus's responsibility to ensure 
his niece's title and to lodge any appropriate protestation should that title be 
threatened (3.43), to ensure that she should be married as a legitimate child, to 
monitor the size of the dowry given with her, and to make any claim to the
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archon necessary to protect her (3.46, 48, 51). Phile's paternal great-uncles had 
been specifically sworn to look after Phile by her father (3.69, 71) and did not 
interfere to protest Endius' refusal to take Phile as his wife (3.69, 70). Endius, 
having taken possession of the estate, gave Phile away in marriage (3.45). Phile, 
as a young woman of fifteen or sixteen, had at least four guardians, all of whom 
had specific duties to perform on her behalf, and three of whom had the 
opportunity to take her as wife.
In these cases, the male guardian was able to exploit his position to the 
benefit of his own financial interest and to the detriment of those he was in a 
moral and legal position to guard. This scenario was a double-edged sword to 
the female ward or epikleros because it involved not only a betrayal, but also an 
obstacle to proper redress. As the closest relative, it was the guardian who was 
supposed to take up her defence and protection in any legal or economic crisis; 
finding another male relative willing and able to do so could have been an 
additional challenge and may have been accomplished only after a significant 
lapse of time and missed opportunities of the kind described in 10.18-21.^9
For epikleroi, the sword was triple-edged, as her relatives or the jury could 
have utilised their right to decide her fate. The speaker in speech 6 asks the jury 
to decide whether Philoctemon's sister, a widow, ought to "fall upon" her 
relatives (èm T0 t>T0 iç YevéoOai) either to be given away to whomever they wish 
or to grow old in widowhood, or, whether, as a legitimate daughter, she should 
be given to her relatives in epidikasia by the jury to whomever they wished (6.51). 
Thus, while an heiress with little money might have trouble finding a male 
relative with whom to live, a large fortune may have been a curse as well. In 
speech 3, the speaker argues that Pyrrhus' uncles would not have left a legitimate 
daughter "who belonged to them by right of kinship" (3.63,72,74) to be taken by 
Xenocles, a stranger to the family (3.65). His stress on the pure financial 
advantage of this, stating that doing so would have made him heir to a large 
fortune (3.65), underscores the financial aspect of claiming epikleroi and the 
wrangling that went on in order to make (at least temporary) claim to the fortune 
that accompanied them.
9^Whether this specific delay was due to the lack of an available male to take up the case is 
doubtful, as the mother was married throughout. It does, however, accentuate the long delays in 
putting forth inheritance claims, which could almost certainly be exacerbated or explained by the 
scenario described.
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This vulnerability is further accentuated in 10.19-20 by the argument that 
the husband of an epikleros was frightened off from making a claim to his wife's 
patrimony by greedy relatives who threatened to take his wife in epidikasia. This 
argument is extreme and of questionable applicability-the opposing relatives 
gave up their claim to marry the epikleros when they themselves married her to 
her husband (10.5-6,19)— but we know from Isaeus that some wives were taken 
from their husbands in such a manner.20 All epikleroi, whether minors or adults, 
married, unmarried or widowed, were in potentially hazardous situations, as the 
protective measures provided for them by custom and law could have been used 
against them.
Conclusion
Ambiguities abound in an investigation of the kind that we have 
undertaken, and it is probable that many of these ambiguities existed in Athens 
among the citizens.22 The speeches of Isaeus reveal a family ethic centred on the 
concepts of legal, economic, and moral protection of those members of a family 
most vulnerable when a male head-of-household died. This family ethic was 
clearly violated in the name of financial self-interest, which, our evidence shows, 
both men and women possessed and expressed. The security of a family was a 
male responsibility, and it was always males who brought a case that sought to 
prove or disprove that this responsibility had been shouldered appropriately. 
Male interest, if not self-interest, determined the security of the family. At the 
most basic level, a male was needed for making a case happen, presenting an 
imbalance in which men could act without the consent of the women they might
2 I^sa. 3.64: "they...in spite of the fact that they are thus married, shall, if their father dies witliout 
leaving them legitimate brothers, pass into the legal power of their next of kin; and indeed it has 
frequently happened that husbands have been thus deprived of their own wives". Fox (1985) 230 
suggests that, while many relatives probably disregarded their right to claim in such a situation, 
bargains were often struck with those who were relentless in pursuing their "right". This is the 
situation, he believes, in Isaeus 10: a deal was done to secure the mother and placate the relative, 
but her son pursued the case as if this had not happened.
21 Fox also notes (229) that Menander had at least three plays called Epikleros: the situation of 
such a woman was not only dramatic, but could be entertainingly so.
22Vet, perhaps not. The questions we are asking, saturated with the concept of modern egalitarian 
rights as tiiey are, may simply not have mattered to the Athenians of the fourth century. They 
may not have known the distinctions we are seeking, but more importantly, they may not have 
cared.
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represent,23 but women could not act without the consent of the men who would 
represent them. A woman who had seen her male relatives pass away and who 
had married a non-family husband, as in 10, was in a particularly difficult 
situation, abandoned by her relatives who still, it appears, held some rights-in- 
abeyance over her. Humphries' accusation that "the laws offering protection from 
exploitation within the oikos were often completely ineffectual" 24 echoes 
resoundingly.
But we must be careful not to cast these conclusions in terms that are too 
easily divided along lines of sex. That Isaeus could argue in speech 10 that an 
uncle had illegally detained and passed on his niece's estate and contend in 
speech 3 that such a disgraceful act was beyond consideration (3.51) 
demonstrates the artifice that suffused these speeches and the scenarios they 
represent. They also provide a critical warning to our evaluation of vulnerable 
women and positions of vulnerability within the family because they reveal the 
ease with which such an accusation could be utilised as an offensive weapon. 
Who, then, was vulnerable? That the Athenians developed customs and enacted 
complex legislation designed to protect those perceived to be vulnerable was 
both ethically and practically sound: in an agonistic male world, orphans, 
epikleroi, and others warranted aid from the state which was itself built on a 
collection of stable and financially secure oikoi. But there are two ironies to this. 
The first is since only families like the ones we see in Isaeus may have been able 
to afford the time and money to take their cases to court, only they may have 
been ensured an opportunity at such protection. The second is the creation of 
formal rules and regulations always engenders their abuse, and it is impossible 
to tell the extent to which the cases we have abuse those rules and regulations. In 
seeking to settle inheritance conflicts in the courts, the state distanced those 
conflicts another degree from the oikoi in which they originated and thus allowed 
for an additional degree of misrepresentation and abuse. The citizens who 
themselves listened, debated, and voted on laws composed the juries that passed 
judgment on cases increasingly dependent on the use of written law. They could 
penetrate the cases with better insight and understanding than we can; whether 
they believed that the court provided, or could provide, justice in inheritance 
conflicts is another question.
2^The reference to Phile's abandonment of the case in 3.6 and the scenario outlined in note 7 
above are possible examples.
24Humphries (1983) 5.
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Chapter Five 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS II
Having investigated legal and economic relationships between women 
and men in Isaeus, we will now look at those economic and legal relationships 
that involved only men. Our task is three-fold: to articulate what Isaeus tells us 
about such relationships, to compare that with our conclusions from the previous 
chapter, and to utilise the insights from both to examine with a more critical eye 
the Athenian legal system and our conceptions of it. We will begin with a look at 
the concept of reciprocity and its role in the Athenian family before moving into 
a detailed examination of guardianship and exploitation, investigating additional 
uses of kurios and giving a special focus to speech 11. We will conclude with a 
comparison of legal and economic relationships defined by sex and the 
questions our investigation has raised about the functions of law and justice in 
Athens.
Reciprocity and the Family
In Athens, a blood relationship was an economic relationship. The law 
mandated that a father could not devise his property to anyone if he possessed a 
legitimate son (10.9), and the anchisteia clearly detailed the order in which the 
appointed relatives could claim, and in what order, the property of the deceased 
(11.1-2). Inheritance was first and foremost a family matter; the relationship one 
had by blood with another dictated a potential economic relationship, and 
because that relationship might have to be proven in court, it formed a legal 
relationship as well. The faithful disposal of specific rituals distinguished one 
both as religiously faithful as well as the rightful heir. The funeral battle between 
the speaker and Diodes in speech 8 (8.21-27, 39) underscores the fusion of 
religion, legitimacy, economics, and the law that placed an inherent economic 
self-interest firmly within the bounds of a conception of family duty defined by 
reciprocity.
Speech 7 illustrates that the benefits and injuries received by one's 
relatives significantly influenced family decisions with financial implications.^
^Tliis is stated specifically in 7.4: "I shall prove to you not only that Apollodorus did not leave liis 
estate to his nearest relatives, having received many injuries (noXXà ôeivà) from them, but also 
that he legally adopted me, his nephew, having received great tilings (euepyexrigGvog) from me."
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Apollodorus requited in concrete financial terms the assistance he had received 
from his step-father. This assistance had enabled him to win back rightful 
ownership of his estate from his avaricious guardian Eupolis. Apollodorus 
contributed money for Archedamus' ransom when Archedamus was held 
hostage, shared money with Archedamus when he was in financial straits, and 
devised his property to Archedamus' daughter (7.8). "By his actions, it is best 
witnessed that Apollodorus thought fit to do well back to those who had done 
well by him...Such was his conduct towards us who had saved him from 
financial ruin...he requited these good services of ours..." (7.8-10). Both 
Apollodorus and Archedamus, and, the speaker argues, those on Archedamus's 
side of the family, benefited from their relationship. Apollodorus and the speaker 
were in a reciprocal relationship as well, the speaker having proved his financial 
prudence in personal, familial, and official capacities and having himself 
provided considerable services to Apollodorus (7.34). These things dictated that 
Apollodorus acted with full knowledge when he made the speaker kurios of his 
property. Conversely, Apollodorus did not leave his estate to those nearest to 
him, the descendants of Eupolis, because they had done many injuries to him 
(7.4). Eupolis's embezzlement of Apollodorus's estate precluded any type of 
financial relationship with Apollodorus or his immediate family. Additionally, 
the neglect of Apollodorus II's oikos by his sisters precluded any similar 
relationship with them or their sons.
This reciprocity also extended to a family's relationship with the state and 
could be passed on from one generation to another in like fashion. In speech 10, 
the speaker states that Xenaenetus's father paid a judgement-debt on behalf of 
the estate (10.15) and then refers to those who "when they have had monetary 
losses, introduce their children into other families in order that they may not 
share in their parents' loss of civic rights" because the family was insolvent or 
encumbered to the state (10.17). Indebtedness to the state thus mandated a loss 
of civic rights, and that loss was passed on to the heir to the estate. Debt to the 
state was tied directly to civic rights. The speaker of 7 could ask the jury in his 
closing statement to requite the financial services Apollodorus provided to the 
state while he was alive by ratifying his intentions for the disposal of his estate as 
detailed in his will (7.40-41). The state could thus requite financial benefit from a 
citizen by granting approval of his will through the jury acting on its behalf.
This biological/legal/economic relationship, while necessitated by law, 
did not always manifest itself in unambiguous terms. Even the simplest of the
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law's mandates—that of a father's economic relationship to his son—was open to 
manipulation. The speaker of speech 6 asserts that Euctemon successfully 
blackmailed his son Philoctemon over his inheritance by threatening to marry a 
second wife and recognizing any children born of their union as legitimate unless 
Philoctemon consented to allowing the sons of his father's prostitute acceptance 
into the phratry (6.22). That he could make such a threat, and that his son would 
give in to it,2 highlights the lack of documentation and the near-total power of 
the father in determining legitimacy, as well as the priority of economic self- 
interest over prestige to the son. The split in the estate necessitated by the 
presence of brothers was more persuasive than the desire to ensure the phratry's 
and the family's legitimate blood. Philoctemon's legitimacy was never in 
question, only his ability to inherit the estate in its entirety.
Speech 5 reveals a similar under-handedness. Menexenus II, representing 
all five cousins suing for shares in an estate, successfully prosecuted a witness 
who testified on behalf of the estate's possessor, Dicaeogenes III, for perjury. His 
possession of the estate compromised, Dicaeogenes III persuaded Menexenus II 
to throw over his fellow-claimants by accepting a share of the estate and 
abandoning further action (5.13). Only when Dicaeogenes III refused to hand 
over the promised share of the estate did Menexenus II go back to the cousins he 
had betrayed and continue the legal action against him (5.14-16).
This kind of exploitation may also have occurred in the case argued in 
speech 1. The former wards of Deinias may well have taken advantage of their 
closeness to Cleonymus as next-of-kin to gain control over his estate after he 
died. They relied on the argument that, because he had raised them in his own 
home as sons, Cleonymus intended to change his will in favour of them. In 
contrast to the lateral exploitation which is found in speech 11—that in which one 
man took advantage of one possessing the same legal and economic power—this 
kind of exploitation was, like the kinds we find in most guardianship 
maltreatment cases, vertical : there was a significant difference in the legal and 
economic authority of the one exploiting and the one being exploited. Ironically, 
however, and in contrast to most cases of vertical exploitation, the kind found in 
speech 1 is carried out by the (former) wards themselves, the death of the 
grandfather having presented an opportunity for them to claim his property. As
2philoctemon backed down on the advice of his relatives, on the condition that he immediately 
receive a single farm.
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with the scenarios outlined in speeches 5 and 6, economic considerations 
prevailed over familial fidelity.
Guardianship and Exploitation
The most significant indications of the priority of economic self-interest 
over biological fidelity are found in those cases in which a guardian was 
entrusted with the supervision of a ward and his estate. The difference between 
these cases and the ones examined above is that the presence of epitropoi was not 
mandated by law; instead, an epitropos was simply named or assumed by 
custom. Guardianship issues between males are found in five of Isaeus' speeches 
(1,2, 6,7, and 11) and in two (1 and 11) they are central to the case being argued. 
In investigating these issues, we will focus on what they can tell us 
about opportunities for exploitation and actual ownership of property, how these 
two are linked, and what similarities and differences exist between these 
guardian-ward relationships and those we investigated in the previous chapter.
In Speech 1, Isaeus represents two uncles, one maternal, one paternal, as 
having been at odds with each other, and, he argues, this conflict prevented the 
wards of the latter from inheriting the estate of the former. The plaintiffs were 
orphaned at an early age and the paternal uncle, Deinias, assumed guardianship 
over them (1.9-10). The maternal uncle, Cleonymus, with whom the wards had a 
close relationship, was childless and willed his estate to other relatives over the 
wards, who were themselves his next-of-kin. The argument was that although 
the orphans had claim to the property, Deinias would have become kurios of it 
because they were still minors (1.10). Allowing such a position to devolve to his 
"bitterest enemy" was unthinkable to Cleonymus.^ The case rests on the 
assumption that Deinias would have had economic control of the estate and 
would have profitted directly from it. Isaeus clearly distinguishes entitlement to 
an estate from financial control of it here, kurios has a distinct economic meaning 
in this passage and is more closely tied to ownership and disposal than the 
genitive absolute indicating the wards' possession of the estate. The guardian of 
a ward's estate would profit from that estate, or could profit from it, even if he 
did not abuse his position.
 ^The argument seems a relatively weak one, as Deinias died long before Cleonymus (1.12), and 
he thus had ample opportunity to change his will, especially if his relationship was as strong with 
his nephews as is argued (1.30; also 1.4,12-15,18,27-29).
70
A passage in speech 6, jiia0coTai §e am oi yevoixevoi xàç mpoooôoug 
Xappotvoiev (6.36), indicates that the guardians themselves received the profits 
from the lease of their ward's estate. A lease for orphans was distinguished from 
other leases by the presence and authority of an agent who was not himself 
entitled to the estate. It was this that made financial exploitation possible. 
Although the horoi of the leased land were inscribed with the orphans' names, it 
was the guardians themselves who profited from the lease. This arrangement, it 
seems, is precisely what is indicated by |ua0oûv...xo'i)<; o ik o u ç  cbç ôp(j)avü5v ôvxmv 
(6.36), literally, "to lease the oikos as being the orphans". The opponents inscribed 
themselves as guardians of the allegedly legitimate sons of Euctemon and 
obtained the archon's permission to lease out part of their property (6.36) 
specifically to obtain control of the deceased's property.
Eupolis similarly exploited his ward to his own advantage in speech 7. 
Eupolis's two brothers, Mneson and Thrasyllus, had recently died, and he had 
become guardian of Thrasyllus' son Apollodorus. He not only "seized for himself 
the whole of Mneson's estate, half of which belonged to Apollodorus" but also "as 
guardian, so administered the affairs of Apollodorus that he was condemned to 
restore three talents to him" (7.6). It was only on attaining the age of majority and 
receiving aid from his stepfather that Apollodorus was able to obtain justice (7.7, 
10). While Eupolis neither married his brother's wife nor took in his brother's son, 
he did control his nephew's estate. Isaeus implies a normative separation of a 
ward from his widowed mother which accentuates the guardian's control and 
possible exploitation of the ward, who was much like an epikleros in that he (or 
she) simply moved with the estate, to be "taken" by the first claimant in the 
anchisteia. It also characterizes the oikos as a financial entity in which the wife 
had—at best—a secondary and disposable place and in which the minor heir's 
place was contingent upon his attainment of the age of majority.
Guardianship, Accountability, and Exploitation
The opportunity for exploitation inherent in the position of guardian was 
ample, but it was also somewhat mitigated. Speeches 2, 6, and 11 demonstrate 
that Athenians were concerned with ensuring at least a small measure of 
accountability in the guardians who supervised their wards' estates. Menecles 
was one of the guardians of the unnamed children of Nicias (2.9) and was 
compelled to sell land that he jointly owned with his brother in order to "pay 
back the money due to the orphan" (2.27, 28). While a guardian or guardians
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could share in the leasing out of a ward's estate, surety of some kind may have 
been required from the guardian to ensure that the ward received the capital of 
the estate and the interest accrued on it when they came of age (2.28). Isaeus 
implies this kind of provision for protection in 6.36, where the speaker mentions 
that part of the estate was leased out and part kept as security (xà 8è à7coxi|iir|iiiaxa 
Kaxaaxa0elTi), but here it is much clearer: at a later point, the guardian had to 
fully reimburse his ward. It seems likely that this was a specific part of the 
gu?0oi)v procedure undertaken in the archon's court (6.36), but it is not specifically 
stated as being mandated by law. Isaeus depicts an ethically and financially 
accountable guardian taking the necessary action (the sale of land) necessary to 
fulfill his obligation to his wards. Were these obligations representative of 
typical guardian-ward relationships? Or only of those in which estates were 
leased out? It is difficult to say, as nowhere else in Isaeus do we have such a 
picture.
Speech 11, On The Estate of Hagnias, reveals a similar provision to ensure 
the accountability of guardians, as well as the opportunities for manipulation 
and exploitation that such provisions created. Theopompus was one of two 
guardians of his deceased brother's (Stratocles) son. Theopompus had won  
control over Hagnias's estate and the second guardian was suing him for 
maltreatment of the mutual ward on the grounds that Theopompus did not 
rightfully share his newly-won estate with him. Surprisingly, the ward seems to 
have no interest in the case. There is no reference to the ward himself pursuing 
the case or any indication that the guardian was the facilitator of his ward's quest 
for justice. While the ward is mentioned several times as having a hypothetical 
share in the estate (11.1,3-5,33- 34) and as having the right to make a claim if he 
were being exploited (11.27-28,33,34), the hypothetical and technical contexts of 
these references are generally impersonal. The venomous rhetoric directed 
specifically at the second guardian, surpassing the accusations of injustice and 
vexatious dealing (11.4, 22, 23, 31,36) that typify Isaeus' speeches, suggests that 
the dispute was one between the guardians and not a guardian and the ward. 
The direct addresses to the opposing guardian,^ the vitriol with which he indicts 
his opponent ("such is the wicked and shameless scoundrel he is": 11.6, "his 
rascality": 11.20, and "fabricated it all out of his greediness": 11.36), and the
^Specifically, the use of o'üxoçtiiroughout, the demand "you, come up here, since you are so clever 
at misrepresenting the laws...I wish to question you" (11.4-5), and the sting of third person verbs 
in tlie opening lines (loxuplÇexai; 11.1, emdxo: 11.3, è^ei eiTietv: 11.3, and eA,EY%Oficyexai: 11.4).
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sentiment expressed in 11,13—that "this fellow should dare to play these 
pettifogging tricks"—accentuate the enmity between two entrusted with looking 
after the child. The opposing speaker's malicious and illegal intent is quite 
distinct from his ward's: "if he can carry out his wishes, he will henceforward 
squander the child's estate with impunity" (11.31).
Four additional passages further clarify the rivalry between the two 
guardians and the secondary, if not incidental, role of the child. The speaker 
claims that his opponent wished "to annoy me in the name of the child" (11.13), 
refutes the opponent's claim that he took a bit of the ward's money (11.14), and 
accuses him of deserving prosecution for his own supervision of the child's estate 
(11.14) and of contriving "these court actions upon my things which you yourself 
have awarded me". Most significantly, he states that his opponent would not 
now be troubling him with this action had the speaker not previously opposed 
his dissipation of the child's estate (11.15). The true nature of the case is now 
clear. The suit was the means of attaining vengeance for a previous attack, in 
which the speaker had sued him for maltreatment of the ward, and of gaining 
control of the estate that had been awarded by adjudication to the speaker. The 
speaker's defeat in the present suit would necessitate his surrender of 
guardianship (11.31), and (at least, part of) the estate he had inherited would be 
placed under the name of the ward, to be controlled solely by his enemy, the 
second guardian.
The common relationship that the guardians had with their ward made 
this double-edged case of lateral exploitation possible, and the financial control 
they exerted over their ward's property specifically facilitated it. Had the 
guardians not been able to accuse each other of mismanagement and dissipation 
of their ward's estates, and were the speaker's holdings in the name of his ward 
not now vulnerable to take-over by the second guardian, this case could not have 
been brought to court. The provision to ensure the accountability of guardians 
lies here: the two guardians in speech 11 were named in order to prevent a 
situation in which a sole guardian utilised his control over his ward's finances to 
his own advantage. The dual guardianship was a provision, like the surety 
guarantee in speech 2, to ensure that the epitropos was accountable. The presence 
of a second guardian would give the minor an immediate advocate if the first 
attempted to exploit him, and the knowledge of such a presence would 
presumably keep both epitropoi honest.
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Yet, this provision itself created the opportunity for the exploitation. The 
ward was merely a pawn in the next stage of an ongoing conflict between his 
guardians. Although it may have reduced conflict in some circumstances, in 
speech 11 the dual guardianship exacerbated conflict, providing an additional 
tool for one enemy to strike at another. Nominally a suit for maltreatment of a 
ward, it had little to do with the child for which the guardians were responsible 
and was the second, and very possibly the third, legal action of the bitter rivalry. 
Had the guardians not been enemies, the ward would still have been incapable of 
stopping either of from advancing a vexatious suit against the other. One could 
always attempt to strip a fellow-guardian of his position in order to obtain the 
total control over the ward's property (11.31) necessary for unhindered 
exploitation. Like both the child it was intended to protect and the court in which 
it was utilised, the dual guardianship became an instrument of advantage.
The laws regulating inheritance were similarly manipulated in speech 2. 
This case was fought between the deceased's brother and adopted son, the 
speaker. He argued that a quarrel had broken out between the two brothers over 
the sale of land required to pay back the orphan mentioned above. The opposing 
speaker had allegedly been scheming to get control of all of his brother's 
property (2.27-31, 37) and charged that the will adopting the speaker was made 
"under the influence of a woman" and therefore invalid. He, consequently, was 
entitled to the estate. Even though the opposing speaker's forensic opponent was 
no longer his brother, the issue was still one of fraternal greed. The dispute was 
merely carried down to the next generation,^ the law prohibiting female 
influence on the making of a will having become the new means of obtaining 
possession of the land.
Conclusions
Isaeus reveals significant similarities between legal/economic relations 
involving men and women and those involving only men. The relations to which 
we have the best access are those in which there has been some kind of 
exploitation by an older male; most notably, a guardian. Minors, whether male or 
female, were vulnerable to exploitation in a manner similar to epikleroi. They
^The intention of keeping the estate within the father's family line here is muddled. The adopted 
son (although he would have left his own fatlier's oikos ) was the father's brother-in-law, and thus 
the estate in a sense moved into the wife’s family. Ensuring the paternal name and bloodline 
could have been the main issue of the dispute.
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were unable to pursue justice on their own, their guardians were often their 
closest relatives, and those guardians had financial control over their resources. 
Yet provisions were made to reduce the risk of this vulnerability for both males 
and females, especially in the dual guardianship and the surety-requirement for 
leases on land in the ward's name.
The differences, however, are more significant and point to the advantage 
that males had over females in the realm of family law. Upon "coming of age", a 
male ward could represent himself in court and pursue a suit for maltreatment 
on his own if there were no other relative to take up his case. "Coming of age" for 
a woman always meant getting married, and because she could not represent 
herself in court, her claim for maltreatment may have been significantly delayed, 
if not dropped altogether.^ A male ward would never be in the situation that 
Philoctemon's sister in 6.51 found herself, where either the relatives or the court 
was to decide her fate, or in the situation of the speaker's mother in 10.19-20, 
where her only possible advocate, her new husband, was silenced by a threat that 
she might be claimed by them as an epikleros.
At the center of this question is the institution of the kurios. Our 
examination of the use of the term in speech 1 demonstrated a distinct economic 
capability, closely tied to rights of disposal and ownership. Kurios has a wholly 
economic sense in speech 8 as well. In the context of explicit financial benefit, the 
speaker of speech 8 says of his intentions towards his grandfather's estate, "...in 
accordance with what was forthcoming, I should seek to be kurios when my 
grandfather died" (8.37). This echoes the economic ramifications of kurios found 
in 8.31, where the speaker states that the brother of the deceased would be kurios 
to the deceased's daughter in marriage, but he would not be kurios of the 
property, as only the sons born of that marriage could be: "...if she were living, he 
himself would not become kurios of the woman's things, but their children, when 
they had come of age."
In speech 7 kurios is associated very closely with the language of 
succession to and bestowal of property. The establishment of the kurios of a 
citizen's things is closely linked with the establishment of a successor (ôu%8o%ov) 
in 7.13-14 and further linked with the commission of property (with 7capa8i8co)u) 
in 7.27. This is given a final emphasis in 7.33-34 where the speaker mentions 
adoption as giving (with 8l8o)|u) one's property to another, and implies that his
^Especially as her guardian would probably give her away to a man with whom he had good 
relations, and who would therefore be resistant to filing suit against him.
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financial capabilities persuaded the grandfather to make him "kurios of his 
things", and in 7.41 where the will is said to have established "the kuria of his 
things".
Yet, the kurios did not necessarily entail an exclusive right to such 
economic power, nor did he possess a solely economic capability. We have seen 
from the previous chapter that women who had kurioi inherited property and 
were knowledgeable about financial affairs; they were also active and influential 
legal agents whose kurioi simply presented their cases in court. A female citizen, 
a minor citizen, and a piece of property always had a kurios, but the meaning of 
the word in relation to each differed. The relation of the individuals involved to 
each other and to the property in question is what mattered. Adult female 
citizens made legal and economic decisions and could have "owned" or 
"disposed of" property in the same manner as a male citizen; wards, whatever 
their sex, could not. The financial exploitation at the heart of Isaeus' speeches was 
the result of broader cultural mores, and while context was significant to the 
meaning of kurios and the role that individuals played in relation to each other, 
the imbalances between the sexes regarding marriage, the age at which marriage 
happened, and representation in court dictated that men had a significant 
advantage in attaining recourse for a crime.
The provisions Athenians constructed and implemented to prevent the 
exploitation of those who were vulnerable in the family seem laudable and 
ethically sound, as they were intended to facilitate the attainment of justice for 
those who did not have reasonable access to it. Isaeus' reference to the successful 
condemnation of the greedy guardian in 7.6 and the restitution to his ward of the 
finances he robbed demonstrates that these provisions were both utilised and 
successful in attaining their objective. Contrary, then, to what we discovered in 
the previous chapter, the laws preventing exploitation in the oikos were effectual. 
But it is clear that the ease and lack of risk with which an accusation of 
exploitation could be levied made it an effective offensive weapon for use against 
an enemy. The great irony of the implementation and use of provisions to 
prevent exploitation was that those provisions themselves could be exploited, 
either to further the exploitation of one who was to be protected, or to take 
advantage of an enemy. As this exploitation was both overt and veiled, those 
whom a modern reader might think least responsible for exploitation could 
themselves have been the instigators. Attempts to prevent exploitation in a 
formal legal manner created new opportunities for it, and the law court became
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an arena of preference for such matters. It was public, powerful, and adversarial, 
and in it, it seems, the law itself became less powerful, more private, and less 
resolutive.
We must be very cautious, however, in making such a judgment. It is easy 
to judge the case in speech 11 as one that abused the laws by utilising them for 
motives other than the attainment of justice. Yet, we assume in drawing such a 
conclusion that the laws as we see them were meant to be utilised with the 
intention of attaining justice as we conceive it.  ^ Speech 11 demonstrates that a 
suit could be only one part of a much larger matrix of political, social, and 
economic competition. Consequently, the attainment of justice would have been 
of little concern to the plaintiffs and probably played a minor role, if any, in the 
jurors' verdict. The long-standing rivalry we find in speech 11 must have been at 
the heart of many of Athenian law court cases, and the Athenian public's 
knowledge of this determined both the function of the law and any justice it may 
have served in a particular case. Conflict and court were symbiotic in Athens. 
The law and the court in which it was utilised were not simply social structures 
to be contravened or obeyed, they were social structures to be manipulated. 
Whatever the principles behind its early development in the fifth century, by the 
time of Isaeus, Athenian law was as much an engine for conflict perpetuation as 
for conflict resolution, each trial another round in the personal, familial, and 
communal struggles that defined the polis and the life and the honour of the men 
and women who lived in it.
^Isaeus's many references to tlie abuse of the laws in his speeches do not tell us specifically what 
constituted "abuse", whether it was different from what we consider it to be, or whether a case 
such as speech 11 was considered to be an example of abuse. Morever, this was always an 
effective accusation to lodge at an opponent, applicable or not.
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CONCLUSION
The speeches of Isaeus possess a wealth of information regarding the 
Athenian family, gender relations, and the law. This dissertation has undertaken 
a preliminary investigation of the speeches as a corpus of evidence. It is by no 
means complete or comprehensive, as the constraints of time and dissertation 
length have dictated that numerous areas are left only partially explored, others 
altogether unexplored. There remains much to do before Isaeus has been fully 
treated. In this dissertation I hope to have revealed the advantages of Isaeus as a 
source for examinations of the Athenian family, gender relations, and the law, 
made a substantive exposition of his contributions in these areas, and used these 
contributions in conjunction with what we know from other sources to clarify 
significant aspects of fourth century Athenian society and social relations.
Inheritance law brought out the worst in the Classical Athenians. In 
contrast to the Funeral Oration of Pericles and other noted passages revealing 
Athenian attitudes and mores, the speeches of Isaeus present an image of a 
bickering, combative, vitriolic people who willingly betrayed their close relatives 
for material gain. In them, we see one of the worst sides of Athenian society, yet, 
ironically, it is the agathoi, the "best ones", whose lives the speeches expose. The 
wrenching nature of these conflicts was partially due to the belief that the 
preservation of wealth was a family responsibility. The Athenians developed a 
diversity of solutions to match the diversity of problems generated by their 
preoccupation with the continuation of the male bloodline and the adequate 
means to support it. Greed was one solution, as Isaeus makes painfully clear. Yet 
there is a more important point. The complexities of life in Classical Athens, in 
particular, war, death, and prolonged male absence from the oikos, made 
strenuous demands on the Athenian family.^ The anchisteia and the inheritance 
laws of which it was a part provided a clear and comprehensible structure to 
guide the transmission of property, but law and custom often did not adequately 
meet those demands. As a result, oikoi were recreated in a variety of ways,^ often 
unexpected and turbulent. The speeches of Isaeus reveal both the struggles that 
families endured, and the belligerent, venomous atmosphere in which they were
I Cox (1998) 130-167. 
^ibid.
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endured, sometimes, over the course of generations. The balance of oikal security 
in Athens was a tenuous one.
The wrenching nature of these speeches was also due to the litigious 
nature of the fourth century polis. Isaeus wrote his speeches in a legal world that 
addressed more articulately and methodically the needs and desires of the 
Athenian people; in his lifetime, the law and its utilisation evolved through ever 
more sophisticated forms. This increase in sophistication, however, generated a 
reciprocal increase in manipulation, drawing both individuals and families into 
the forensic fray that became characteristic of late Classical life. The Athenian 
legal system provided wronged family members recourse to justice; it also 
provided avaricious family members the opportunity to attain wealth and 
offended family members the opportunity to attain vengeance. The democratic 
legal system aided each: citizens were entitled to "self-help" via access to and 
utilisation of the law created by and for them. The expertise of the logographos 
aided each: Isaeus knew the laws of Athens and how to utilise them effectively to 
make a persuasive argument.^ And the court itself aided each: the adversarial 
forensic arena gave a citizen the opportunity to meet his opponent face to face in 
front of those who would pass judgment.
Consequently, an entire family, and not merely the individual charged 
with an offense, could be on trial in an inheritance conflict. Cases challenging the 
legitimacy or citizenship of a member of one’s household put the entire oikos at 
risk. A judgement of illegitimacy had long-lasting repercussions: the individual 
charged would lose the ability to inherit and would suffer the social shame of 
notheia as well as the loss of a significant means of supporting a family. A 
judgement depriving one of citizenship was even worse: the individual in 
question and all members of his/her future bloodline would lose rights to 
inheritance and political participation. The benefits of Athenian citizenship 
would be closed forever to the descendants of that family. One indiscretion or 
mistake in private life could have public affects of the greatest magnitude. Sexual 
relationships in Classical Athens were more determinate and the situations in
brief summary of Isaeus's cleverness and skill as a logographos: he argued that affinity dictated 
succession in two cases (4, 8), that affinity and affection together dictated inlieritance in another 
(1), and Üiat affection alone should dictate it in a third (9); he accentuated the importance of a 
one-generation gap (11) and a lack of previous challenges to adjudication (3) when these 
benefited him but ignored or refuted tlxem when they did not (8, 10); and he asserted that 
uncles could not possibly have exploited a female ward (3) in one case when such an assertion 
formed the basis of liis argument in another (10).
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which they were pursued more open to question than in modern Britain or the 
United States because the Athenian family was linked directly to the state via 
legitimacy and citizenship. As the accusation that a citizen or a citizen's oikos had 
been penetrated was one of the most potent weapons a citizen could levy against 
another in court, succession to property may have been only one, and perhaps 
the least important, concern in an inheritance-related trial. Isaeus's speeches 
illustrate the battles to gain entry into and force exit from the gate of sexuality 
that guarded social, economic, and political privilege in Athens. They also 
illustrate the special vulnerability of women in these battles.
We should pause briefly to consider one important point; we lack 
reasonable access to evidence of the emotional bonds that for many, if not most 
Athenians, would have proven to be the strongest and most definitive 
manifestations of family. Isaeus provides only a few convincing examples of 
these bonds. He argues for the merits of affection in adjudicating an estate (9), he 
tells us that a wife of child-bearing age left her infertile husband only upon the 
insistence of her closest relatives (2.7-9), and he demonstrates the help and 
affection a father-in-law provided a son-in-law abandoned and robbed by his 
guardian (7.7). These are enough to demonstrate that emotional issues and love 
mattered to the Athenians and would often have overridden the more concrete 
and tangible manifestations of family to which we have much greater access. In 
many situations, and over the course of many years, these bonds would have 
provided the Athenian family with stability and security in the face of change 
and hardship.
One scholar has recently declared that the family is "the active fashioner 
of relationships and identities from which and with which its members engage 
the larger world '.^ To what degree, then, did the oikos and its members contribute 
to or create the conflicts about which we have read? Our investigation has 
shown that female citizens possessed overt capabilities that were beneficial to 
themselves and their families. They also possessed equally, if not more 
significant, covert capabilities,^ which put them in influential roles as mediators 
and advisors in family conflicts.^ In these capacities, Athenian women 
specifically benefited from family conflict. On both public and private levels, 
they, like their menfolk, manipulated the law and custom for themselves and
^Patterson (1998) 229.
Spoxliall (1989,1996).
^Cox (1998) vi-vii, 68-104.
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their households and accumulated "social wealth" as a result. Conflict 
consequently became a behaviour learned at home, its rewards realised and 
valued by the children that man and wife raised in the oikos . If the private sphere 
of Athenian life was the "source and focus of relationships essential to the well­
being of the community",^ it was also the source and focus of relationships 
essential to the community's ill-health.
The study of the Athenian family hinges on the view one takes of conflict. 
Richard Wevers sees the speeches of Isaeus as a savage indictment of the 
Athenian elite and symptomatic of a society in decline.^ Cynthia Patterson, on 
the other hand, emphasises the dynamism and resilience of the Athenian family 
and its interest in the well-being and protection of its members.^ It is on this issue 
that social anthropology has aided the study of the Athenian family the most:^  ^it 
has taught us the importance of examining conflict outside of our own value 
systems and from multiple perspectives. In Athens, the legal system reflected the 
benefits of conflict to the Athenian in its curious combination of zeal and 
ambivalence.^^ The jury-selection and court-assignment machines testify to the 
Athenian preoccupation for fairness and objectivity; the forensic valuation of 
personal character, wealth, and sexual behaviour testify to its obsession with 
context and subjectivity. The absence of legal definitions and records in a 
society that recognised the significance of writing and its application to the law is 
telling. The multiplicity of means of pursuing litigation in A t h e n s ^ 2 ig telling as 
well. Both signal to us that the Athenians could easily have provided themselves 
with what they needed to ensure greater legal clarity in the interest of regulating 
conflict. Yet, they did not. The regulation of conflict may have been an objective 
of the Athenian legal system, but it was clearly not its end or ultimate priority.
Like all legal systems, Athens's was embedded in a matrix of social values 
and relationships; the tensions between objectivity and subjectivity, zeal and 
ambivalence, stricture and principle provided fuel for the "social drama"^  ^ that 
fired Athenian life. This drama depended on conflict. The law court necessarily 
developed out of the desire to regulate conflict in society, but its values were
^Patterson (1998) 226.
^Wevers (1969) 121.
^Patterson (1998) esp. 3,88,97,226-230.
^ S^ee Foxhall (1996) and Cohen (1994) 1-70.
^^ See Cary (1996) for an extensive review of "the ambiguity in the Athenian attitude to the law".
^^Osboume (1985) 52.
l^ibid.
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never divorced from those that infused daily life. Conflict was too valuable to be 
resolved, restricted, or eliminated by the "rule of law".^  ^Such a concept would 
have been severely criticised, if not wholly misunderstood, by a Classical 
Athenian. Consequently, many of the advantages and disadvantages the 
Athenian legal system provided to its citizen-actors^^ are either dimly visible or 
wholly invisible to us. The "meaning and location of law"^  ^ was different in 
Athens because the "meaning and location" of both conflict and the family were 
different. The question with which we are faced is ultimately one of character. 
The Athenians themselves utilised the law for their own purposes against their 
own relatives, instigating and pursuing conflict with those to whom they were 
closest in affinity and affection. Family and city alike existed in a tight tension 
between the forces of harmony and strife.
In one final sense, the conflict that defines Isaeus's speeches was 
inarguably positive: it was the sign of an active, accessible, and well-utilised legal 
system. In Athens the law did what it was supposed to do. It gave the citizens the 
opportunity to seek justice or, at very least, to pursue their interests when they 
felt they had a rightful claim. Athens was an open society in which inheritance 
conflicts helped to define and maintain a social equilibrium; because it was also a 
competitive society that highly valued public manifestations of honour, those 
conflicts contributed to the evolution of individual and collective self-definition. 
Isaeus's speeches reflect an important societal health and vigour. In contrast to 
totalitarian regimes which impose order on society, democracies are 
characterised by conflict. Much more importantly, they are characterised by the 
freedom to pursue it.
The presence of legal manipulation, its manipulators, and familial conflict 
was neither new nor unanticipated in Athens. In realising the potential for such
^^Foxhall (1996a) 7: "Law, for the Greeks, was a tool, not a master." Contrast this with Lawless’s 
(1991) comments, "non-legal arguments and irrelevancies are prominent" (130) and "according to 
strict rules, the adoption was incomplete and therefore invalid" (24). While valuable in 
demarcating die differences in the basis of legal judgement between Üie Athenian system and the 
modem American system, they betray an anachronistic view of the Atlienian legal system. 
Lawless does not consider that such things as strict rules simply did not matter, or mattered no 
more than alternative considerations, to the Athenians. So, also, the "difficulty of proof" and 
"some basic Athenian uncertainty" (46) regarding what constituted a legal marriage.
^^Access for each citizen to as many of the roles in the "social drama" as possible was of profound 
import for that drama to be effective and democratic. Thus, Todd (1993) 291: "The most 
important underlying characteristic of Athenian democracy is that it was and remained an 
amateur system". 
l^Foxhall (1996) 140.
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manipulation and conflict, the Athenian law-givers constructed a system that 
would do all it could do: trust the representative sample of citizens that made up 
the jury to give its verdict to the best of its ability. This was the simplicity and the 
genius of the Athenian legal system. A democratic society must ultimately 
entrust its own well-being and the resolution of its conflicts to its citizens, placing 
faith in them above the static and unyielding words of stricture or even the 
nobler and more sensitive principles out of which they d e v e l o p . I t  was a 
realistic approach to law and its trials, fully aware of the potential for 
manipulation by litigants and logographoi, wholly cognisant of the ignorance and 
fickleness of citizen juries, but equally committed to the flexibility, freedom of 
interpretation, and awareness of extenuating circumstance that real justice 
requires.
^^This faith in the jury typifies the Athenian concept of the state asa Koivovia, or "community of 
interests". See Todd and Millett (1990) 16.
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Appendix: The Women of Isaeus
This is a list of the most significant women mentioned in Isaeus. Capital letters 
indicate the name by which the woman is most easily identified: first names are 
only provided for five women, so most refer to her closest male relative.
ALCE, prostitute and manager of Euctemon's tenement house, persuaded him to 
adopt her sons: 6.20f.
sister of APOLLODORUS, daughter of Archedamus, asked permission by her 
brother to adopt her son as his heir: 7.14.
daughter of ARISTARCHUS, mother of the speaker, entitled to the estate of 
Aristarchus: 10.3f.
CALLIFE, daughter of Pistoxenus, alleged second wife of Euctemon: 6.13.
daughter of CIRON, mother of the speaker, object of the opposition's speech as 
illegitimate, presided at the Thesmophoria: 8.19.
CLEITARETE, alternate name for Phile, also Phile's grandmother 3.30f..
mother of DICAEOGENES III, accused her son of scandalous acts from the 
shrine of Eileithyia: 5.39.
wife of DIOCLES of Pithus, presided at the Thesmophoria: 8.19.
mother of HAGNIAS, claimant to the estate of Hagnias: 11.16f.
sister of MACARTATUS, persuaded her husband to allow their son to be 
adopted: 11.49.
second wife of MENECLES, sister of the speaker, alleged to have persuaded him 
to adopt the speaker by will: 2.If.
sister of NICODEMUS, wife of Pyrrhus, mother of Phile, alleged citizen hetaira: 
3.8f.
PHILE, sister of Nicodemus, wife of Xenocles, alleged daughter of Pyrrhus, and 
claimant to Pyrrhus' estate: 3.1f.
PHYLOMACHEII, daughter of Euboulides, claimant to the estate of Hagnias: 
11.9f.
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wife of PRONAPES, daughter of Eupolis, wife of Aeschines of Lusia, and 
claimant to the estate of Apollodorus: 7.2f.
wife of PROTARCHIDES, daughter of Menexenus, formerly married to 
Democles, and claimant to the estate of Dicaeogenes II: 5.6f.
sister of PYRRHUS, mother of the opposing speaker, claimant to Pyrrhus's estate: 
3.3f.
wife of STRATOCLES, drew up inventory of her husband's wealth: 11.43.
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